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The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus:
An Argument for a Return to First Principles
LARRY W. YACKLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The exhaustion doctrine in federal habeas corpus contemplates not the
relinquishment of federal jurisdiction to determine the merits of federal claims
arising in state criminal prosecutions, but the appropriate timing of an un-
doubted federal power to adjudicate in due course.' Simply stated, the doc-
trine postpones federal review until petitioners have exhausted state judicial
remedies still available for the treatment of their federal claims at the time
they wish to apply for federal relief. 2 The resulting delay is justified on the
twin grounds that earlier federal intervention would disrupt the orderly ad-
ministration of state criminal prosecutions 3 and deprive the state courts of
their rightful part in making and enforcing federal law.4 The working prin-
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, University of Kansas; LL.M. 1974,
Harvard University. Readers should know that I consulted with counsel on both sides of the litigation that
resulted in the Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), a case I will examine below. In
conversations and correspondence with Mr. John C. Zimmerman, then Assistant Attorney General for the State
of Tennessee, I tried to point out what I considered to be the flaws in his argument, and in similar contacts with
Mr. D. Shannon Smith, who represented the prisoner, I made suggestions for the brief and oral argument. I
suspect I benefited more from the experience than did counsel, both of whom taught me something about federal
habeas corpus along the way. I am indebted to Mr. Zimmerman for providing me with a copy of the transcript of
oral argument, from which I steal a quotation or two.
1. See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939) (the exhaustion doctrine "is not one defining power but
one which relates to the appropriate exercise of power"). The doctrine was "first articulated" by the Supreme
Court in cases described below and then "incorporated" into the Judicial Code. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 80 (1977). The relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1976), provides as follows:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State
corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by
any available procedure, the question presented.
2. State remedies that were available at one time, but for some reason are no longer accessible to the
prisoner, are relevant not to the question of exhaustion but to the related matter ofthe effect to be given abortive
state proceedings. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80-82 (1977). The Justices have not always been so
precise. In Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959), Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court attempted to resolve a
question touching the prisoner's procedural default in state court by reference to the exhaustion doctrine,
suggesting essentially that prisoners might be turned away from the federal forum for failing to "exhaust" state
procedures no longer available to them. Id. at 405-06. Professor Hart quickly pointed out that the Irvin analysis
would preclude many federal claims altogether, because prisoners would be unable to cure their failure to
exhaust by seeking relief from the state courts and returning to federal habeas. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958
Term--Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 112-14 (1959). Thereafter Justice
Brennan corrected his mistake in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,424-26 (1963), in which the exhaustion doctrine was
limited to state remedies still available at the time federal habeas relief is sought.
3. Developments in tire Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARM. L. REV. 1038, 1094 (1970).
4. Id. See generally Robb v. Connolly, Ill U.S. 624, 637 (1884):
Upon the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce,
and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States and the laws made
in pursuance thereof, whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding before them.
Other rationales for the exhaustion doctrine have been offered from time to time. E.g., Goodloe v. Parratt. 605
F.2d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 1979) (suggesting that the exhaustion doctrine may alleviate the burden on federal
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ciple, borrowed from the law of nations, is the notion of comity-the recogni-
tion that the courts of coordinate systems can and must exercise forbearance
in cases in which both are interested, lest they interfere with each other,
create confusion and distrust, and sacrifice the utility that comes with coop-
eration.5 To be effective, the exhaustion doctrine must be flexible. It must
present the federal courts with general guidance, but permit them to appraise
the circumstances in each case with sensitivity to competing interests. The
doctrine is, or ought to be, a fact-oriented rule of prudence and discretion,
applied on a case-by-case basis to orchestrate the exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion in an effective manner without disrupting or displacing the work of the
state courts. That, at any rate, is the theory on which the federal habeas
courts have operated for a hundred years. 6
Recent developments have drawn this previously well-established under-
standing of the exhaustion doctrine into question. Some courts and some
Justices have displayed a demonstrable tendency to transform the doctrine
into something approaching a jurisdictional barrier to federal review. Ev-
idence of this transformation appears on two levels. First, exhaustion doc-
trine issues are increasingly treated as though they were jurisdictional. 7 Juris-
dictional language is used, and jurisdictional consequences are invoked, when
the doctrine is found unsatisfied.8 Second, the federal courts' discretion in
exhaustion cases is gradually being replaced by a set of rigid rules that fails to
serve the doctrine's rationales and, indeed, threatens to create greater friction
between the federal and state courts. 9 These inflexible rules are unrealistic at
best. They imply that the federal district courts cannot be trusted to apply a
dockets by channeling federal issues to the state courts where relief may be granted and federal review rendered
unnecessary); Rose v. Dickson, 327 F.2d 27, 28 (9th Cir. 1964) (suggesting that state judges are in the best
position to examine federal claims arising in local proceedings attended by procedures and rules with which they
alone are familiar). If valid at all, see infra text accompanying notes 229-32, these justifications are at best -'less
persuasive" than the paramount rationales treated in the text. Developments in the Last-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1094 n.5 (1970).
5. See Er parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252 (1886) (relying on comity as the basis for the exhaustion
doctrine). See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80 (1977); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 208 (1950).
The most familiar articulation of the comity notion in international law is Justice Gray's opinion in Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 57-136.
7. The federal courts' jurisdiction, in the fundamental sense of power to adjudicate, was established at
least as early as the Judiciary Act of 1789 and was extended to attacks on state custody in 1867. Act of Feb. 5,
1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86; cf. Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605
(arguing that the suspension clause provides a constitutional basis for the habeas jurisdiction). The current
version of the Act is found at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1976). While the 1948 legislation that "codified- the
exhaustion doctrine contains language that suggests ajurisdictional grant, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976), clearly
the federal courts enjoyed the power to entertain petitions well before that time. The Court's occasional lapses
should not be taken as evidence to the contrary. See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency,
102 S. Ct. 3231, 3236 n.9 (1982) ("[jlurisdiction to challenge both state and federal judgments is conferred by §
2241" but § 2254 confers "'general jurisdiction" to entertain collateral attacks on state judgments); Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 n.l (1982) (§ 2254(a) "empowers" the federal courts to entertain challenges to state
court judgments).
8. See infra notes 148-85 and accompanying text.
9. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 136 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (arguing that "the
Court's preoccupation with procedural hurdles is more likely to complicate than to simplify the processing of
habeas corpus petitions by federal judges").
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discretionary doctrine properly and that, left to themselves, federal judges
would lurch to the merits of federal claims without just cause. At worst the
rules are misleading. They are presented, like all procedural rules, as value-
neutral devices geared to the efficiency of the process rather than the sub-
stance of the issues at stake. Yet they operate irrationally and harshly to
deprive litigants of effective access to the federal forum.'0
These developments, in turn, must be understood in context. It is no
secret that the general availability of the federal, trial-level forum for the
litigation of federal claims has been drastically curtailed in the last decade. "
The Warren Court not only established substantive principles for the protec-
tion of individual liberty, but constructed federal enforcement machinery to
ensure respect for its new decisions. ' 2 The Burger Court has left most sub-
stantive precedents in place, but has chipped away at the federal enforcement
machinery and has erected new procedural barriers when none existed pre-
viously. '3 The books abound with fitting illustrations. "4 For present purposes,
the "equitable restraint" cases are most significant.'5 The Warren Court re-
vived the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 as an appropriate vehicle to enforce
fourteenth amendment rights during the civil rights movement in the 1960s. '
6
In a series of decisions, the Court freed section 1983 actions from any re-
10. See infra notes 186-261 and accompanying text.
11. See generally SOCIETY OF AMERICAN LAW TEACHERS, SUPREME COURT DENIAL OF CIZEN
ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS TO CHALLENGE UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR OTHER UNLAWFUL ACTIONS:
THE RECORD OF THE BURGER COURT (1976).
12. Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism," LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer 1980, at 39,
43-44. See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
13. See Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes tire Federal Courts Out of the
Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (1977).
14. 1 count the Court's recent justiciability decisions. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); see LeBel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique
and an Alternative Framework for Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1013 (finding in the Burger Court's recent deci-
sions a repudiation of standing analysis established during the Warren era). Compare Brilmayer, The Jurispru-
dence of Article 111: Perspectives on the "'Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979)
(providing an essential apologia for the Court's "standing" cases), with Tushnet, The Sociology of Article 11:A
Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980) (putting forward a more critical analysis). Less
visible manipulations of the standards for class actions are also illustrative. E.g., General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147 (1982) (refusing to permit an employee who had been denied promotion to represent a class including
persons denied employment); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (reading Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)
to require personal notice by mail to approximately two million class members); see Chayes, The Supreme
Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law, Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982)
(appraising both the standing and class action cases for their impact on the ability of the federal courts to reach
and dispose of constitutional issues). The application of abstention principles in civil liberties cases provides a
further example. E.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979). For a good discus-
sion, see generally Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1977).
15. I distinguish Pullman- and Burford-type abstention cases from the decisions that rest on an asserted
restraint in exercising the federal courts' power to issue equitable relief. As a general matter, the abstention
doctrines prefer early state court litigation in the hope that the state courts' resolution of state law issues will
make it unnecessary for a federal court to reach and determine posterior federal issues. The "equitable re-
straint" cases place the litigation offederal issues with the state courts. See generally Theis, Younger v. Harris:
Federalism in Context, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 103 (1981) (collecting relevant authorities).
16. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see Developments in tie Law-Section 1983 and Federal-
ism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1169(1977) (Monroe "resurrected section 1983 from ninety years of obscurity").
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quirement that state judicial or administrative remedies be exhausted,' 7 ex-
cepted them from the Anti-Injunction Statute,' 8 and opened them to a wide
range of federal claims, all to be adjudicated in the federal forum.' 9 When,
however, the change in the Court's membership began to affect its judgments,
the Younger20 line of cases gradually pushed would-be federal litigants back
into the state courts. While the Court still has not fastened an exhaustion
doctrine on section 1983 litigation generally,22 it has held that federal claims
can be shunted off to the state courts even if the litigant desiring a federal
forum wins the race to the court house door, 23 that unfavorable judgments
returned by the state courts must be appealed within the state system, 24 and
that ordinary collateral estoppel rules will operate thereafter to bar the re-
litigation of issues in federal court.25 This last is most important. It promises
not merely to defer federal consideration of issues, but to foreclose federal
treatment of the merits entirely. 6
One should expect the Burger Court's apparent preference for state court
litigation of federal claims to spill over into the habeas field. The modem
availability of the postconviction writ rests on two propositions that the
Younger line of cases would deny. First, the enforcement of federal standards
can be effective only if prisoners' claims are treated in proceedings collateral
to the criminal trial itself, in which attention is focused on the question of
factual guilt and federal safeguards may be subordinated to expediency. 7
Second, those separate proceedings must be held in a federal forum, where
Article III judges with life tenure assume primary responsibility for the en-
forcement of the Constitution. 28 These two propositions were firmly estab-
lished for a score of years in the wake of the watershed decision, Brown v.
17. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674-76 (1963) (administrative remedies); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (judicial remedies). See generally Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies under the Civil
Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1968).
18. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
19. See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
The -'cause of action" statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1980), does not itself establish federal court power to
adjudicate, but works in tandem with the jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. 1981), to lodge
federal constitutional issues in the federal forum. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600,
615 (1979).
20. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
21. See Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1129-30 (1977) (ascribing responsibility for the development
of the Younger analysis to the Nixon appointees).
22. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require § 1983 plaintiffs to exhaust
state administrative remedies in advance of federal court litigation).
23. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
24. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
25. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
26. See Developments in the Law.-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1331-60 (1977).
27. See Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 78
(1964).
28. See Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 106-07 (1959).
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Allen.29 The Warren Court's great trilogy of habeas cases, Fay v. Noia,3 °
Townsend v. Sain, I and Sanders v. United States,32 all decided in 1963, built
upon Brown and elaborated a complete, internally consistent system of
federal postconviction review.33
The Warren Court undoubtedly believed that at least the threat of federal
collateral review in habeas was necessary to impress upon recalcitrant state
courts that the Court's innovations in criminal procedure had to be re-
spected. 34 Only a decade ago, it was possible to take stock of habeas devel-
opments, to describe the writ and its supporting rationales in precisely this
way, and to suggest, at least implicitly, that the habeas jurisdiction, so de-
scribed and justified, had at last won a vital place in American public law.35
Today it is widely accepted that postconviction habeas plays an essential role
in the criminal justice system.36 The Great Writ provides the machinery by
which the Constitution is enforced on a daily basis. I, for one, despair for the
maintenance of federal safeguards in criminal cases if the availability of
habeas is curtailed and the making and application of federal standards is left
to the state courts, subject to occasional direct review in the Supreme Court
itself. 37 Some of the Justices now sitting take a different view. 38 They have
revived old controversies in which the fundamental propositions supporting
the availability of the writ have again come under examination.39 Indeed, they
have squarely proposed that some federal claims can be enforced successfully
29. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See generally Developments in the Lat-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 1038, 1056-62 (1970).
30. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
31. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
32. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
33. I have tried to describe that system in L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES (1981).
34. I frankly doubt that any Justice then sitting wished for the routine relitigation of state criminal cases in
the lower federal courts. Rather, the aim was to establish habeas corpus as an effective supervisory tool, which
would encourage the state courts to take seriously their responsibilities to respect federal standards-making
federal examination of federal claims, and certainly the award of federal relief, unnecessary. See Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (placing emphasis on the "'threat" of federal
review in habeas).
35. Developments in the La.-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1061-62 (1970).
36. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COM-
MENTS, AND QUESTIONS 1546-1635 (5th ed. 1980); F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION ch. 26 (2d ed. 1982). While occasional attempts
have been made in Congress to curtail the availability of collateral review in habeas, to date those efforts have
been uniformly unsuccessful. See Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 609 (1983) (surveying the most recent legislative assault on the federal writ).
37. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (making the argument that the state
courts do not provide sufficient protection for citizens' federal rights).
38. See, e.g., Snead v. Stringer, 454 U.S. 988, 993-94 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., joined by the Chief Justice &
O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (complaining that "[i]t is scarcely surprising that fewer and
fewer capable lawyers can be found to serve on state benches when they may find their considered decisions
overturned by the ruling of a single federal districtjudge on grounds as tenuous as these"). The Court's majority
has squarely rejected the argument that only life-tenured, Article III judges are competent to pass on federal
issues arising in criminal prosecutions. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381-83 (1977).
39. See L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 21 (1981) (describing the primary themes in recent
cases).
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at trial or on direct review without the backstop of federal collateral proceed-
ings 40 and that all claims may properly be subordinated to the demands of
orderly state court administration, subject to exceptions essential to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.4' Within the habeas field, as in the Younger cases,
there have been and continue to be efforts to preclude entirely claims that
were, or might have been, litigated in state court.42
Other contributors to this symposium have addressed these vexing mat-
ters, however, and I intend to focus elsewhere. My enterprise is an examina-
tion and criticism of recent innovations regarding the exhaustion doctrine.
The doctrine assumes the federal habeas courts' authority to reach the merits
of federal claims at some point and seeks only to choose the occasion for that
adjudication, balancing the individual's interest in early consideration of what
may be meritorious claims against the state's countervailing interests in order-
ly procedures and an opportunity to contribute to the enforcement of federal
law.43 The exhaustion doctrine, properly understood and applied, has nothing
to do with preclusion. Indeed, the essence of my quarrel with recent decisions
is that they seem calculated to make the doctrine precisely what it is not. If
the desirability of postconviction habeas, not to say its legitimacy, is to be
questioned, if ostensibly valid claims are not to be entertained in habeas as a
sequel to state court litigation, then the appropriate means to that end is
hardly to be found in the exhaustion doctrine. To put it bluntly, we cannot
have it both ways. We cannot force prisoners to litigate first in state court on
the ground that federal habeas review should properly await state court ad-
judication and then propose that, the state courts having denied relief, federal
habeas review is no longer appropriate. 44 I have my doubts about the Younger
cases, which may accomplish a similar end by denying federal injunctive relief
40. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,494-95 (1976) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims may be
entertained in federal habeas only if the state courts fail to provide an "opportunity" for "full and fair litigation"
of those claims); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250-71 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)
(suggesting the essentials of the analysis later accepted in Stone).
41. E.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (refusing to vary the approach to abortive state proceedings
according to the character of a prisoner's claim).
42. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
43. See Developments in the Law--Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1094-95 (1970).
44. I am aware that Professor Bator argues that the exhaustion doctrine is "intelligible" only if it is
presumed that the state courts will be allowed to decide both state and federal questions arising in a case and
that their decisions will "count." Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441,483 (1963). "It would make little sense," Batorargues, "to encourage the use
of state remedial processes through a requirement of exhaustion only in order to ignore these processes on
collateral attack." Id. (citing In re Spencer, 228 U.S. 652,660 (1913) (the exhaustion doctrine " would be useless
except to enforce a temporary delay if it did not compel a review of the question in the state court and, in the
event of an adverse decision, the prosecution of error from [the Supreme Court]")). I am aware of his argument,
but I do not understand it. I recognize that prior to Noia in 1963 habeas applicants had to seek direct review in
the Supreme Court before requesting collateral review in habeas. See infra note 112. That, I assume, is what the
Court meant to point out in Spencer. I recognize, too, that at the time Royall was decided only "'jurisdictional"
questions were cognizable in habeas (for whatever reason). Not even Bator would propose, however, that the
later softening of the jurisdictional limit in habeas had much to do with the nature of the exhaustion doctrine. All
that aside, it seems clear that the exhaustion doctrine generally is "'intelligible" only if collateral review in
habeas is available as a sequel to state court litigation. As the discussion in the text makes clear, see infra text
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pending state court litigation and then barring it later by virtue of res
judicata. 45 However that may be, nothing of the sort can be defended in the
habeas context, in which res judicata is inapplicable and the relitigation of
claims is routine. 6 The exhaustion doctrine, again, is a discretionary rule
regarding the appropriate timing of federal collateral review. It cannot be
recruited to the service of a campaign to preclude the federal forum in favor of
adjudication in the courts of the states. I mean in what follows to demonstrate
why that is so.
II. A PROPOSED APPROACH
I will argue for a return to first principles. The initial decision in the field,
Ex parte Royall,47 placed primary emphasis on the federal habeas courts'
jurisdictional power to inquire into the cause of a prisoner's detention and to
order discharge if the custody under attack is found to be in violation of
federal law. 48 The exhaustion of state remedies prior to federal review entered
Royall only in the Court's recognition that the federal courts have discretion
to withhold the exercise of their jurisdiction until the appropriate time: "that
discretion, however, to be subordinated to any special circumstances requir-
ing immediate action.", 49 Modern courts should take seriously the basic mes-
sage in Royall. Habeas jurisdiction exists in all cases, and when "special
circumstances" demanding immediate action are presented, that jurisdiction
should be exercised. In the run of cases, the courts should defer federal
review in their discretion.50
accompanying notes 47-50, the Royall Court explicitly stated that the federal courts have jurisdiction to enter-
tain federal claims before or after trial in state court. That critical matter being settled, it would make no sense
whatever to subvert the habeas jurisdiction by channeling litigation into the state courts and giving their
judgments preclusive effect. Accord Brilmayer, State Forfeiture Rules and Federal Review of State Criminal
Convictions, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 741, 765 (1982) (arguing that the exhaustion doctrine in habeas makes the
application of preclusion rules "'almost entirely illogical because the case is never ripe for federal scrutiny until
the state itself deems the resolution final"); Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 637 (1982) (stating that Royall's "explicit recognition of federal relitigation
authority" is inconsistent with Bator's view that state court judgments regarding federal claims must be ac-
cepted as -'correct- even if a federal habeas court would have reached a different decision).
45. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 n. 18 (1975). See also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)
(ordinary collateral estoppel rules apply when litigants raise issues in federal civil rights lawsuits that were
determined unfavorably in previous state court litigation).
46. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924).
47. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
48. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
49. 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
50. Royall itself had it the other way. The Court focused on the federal courts' power to entertain federal
challenges to state custody at any time and only permitted the postponement of federal review as an exception to
immediate adjudication-grounded in the habeas courts' discretion to stay their hand in deference to state court
treatment of the same claims. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. A fair amount of water has gone
under the bridge since then, however, and I do not propose now to resurrect Royall's specifics, to argue that
immediate adjudication is the rule and delay is the exception, and thus to challenge the rudiments of the modem
exhaustion doctrine. As a general matter, I am content with the balance of competing interests struck by the
doctrine, provided it is understood and enforced in the fashion described below. See Amsterdam, Criminal
Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to
Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 902 (1965) (labelling as "perverse" the development from
1983]
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The best illustration, beyond Royall, is Justice Black's majority opinion
in Frisbie v. Collins.5' Responding to the State's "cloudy" argument that the
prisoner's petition should have been dismissed for want of exhaustion, Justice
Black recognized the "general rule" established in Royall and intervening
cases. 52 He explained, however, that the "general rule" is not "rigid" and
"inflexible" in its operation:
[Dlistrict courts may deviate from it and grant relief in special circumstances.
Whether such circumstances exist calls for a factual appraisal by the court in each
special situation. Determination of this issue, like others, is largely left to the trial
courts subject to appropriate review by the courts of appeals.5 3
In Frisbie the circuit court had addressed the exhaustion doctrine explicitly
and had found "special circumstances" requiring prompt federal intervention
"in this case.", 54 Justice Black acquiesced:
It would serve no useful purpose to review those special circumstances in
detail. They are peculiar to this case, may never come up again, and a discussion
of them could not give precision to the "special circumstances" rule. It is suf-
ficient to say that there are sound arguments to support the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that prompt decision of the issues raised was desirable.
55
This language captures the essence of the exhaustion doctrine, as it was
and should be again.5 6 Federal courts should examine the circumstances of
each case and on that basis determine whether it is reasonable to send the
petitioner back to the state courts or, instead, to reach the merits imme-
diately. As a general rule, petitioners should be required to pursue identifiable
state remedies that promise a reasonable opportunity for litigation of their
federal claims. If the federal courts reach the merits immediately notwith-
standing the availability of state procedures, they should have sound reasons
for concluding that prompt federal review is desirable. More than that need
not be said. The lower federal courts can be trusted to exercise their discre-
tion responsibly. In any case, the introduction of rigid rules designed to dis-
place the exercise of discretion undercuts the exhaustion doctrine as it was
Royall of a doctrine that favors the "dilatory exercise" of the habeas jurisdiction, but approving exhaustion
generally in cases in which expeditious federal adjudication is not justified for the protection of federal rights put
in jeopardy by unsympathetic state courts).
51. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
52. Id. at 520.
53. Id. at 521.
54. Id. at 521-22.
55. Id. at 522.
56. Frisbie has at times been understood as essentially aberrational, contemplating as it does that individual
habeas judges, rather than the federal system as a whole, will exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis. See,
e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 50, at 889 n.408. That understanding may be accurate, but even if it is Frisbie
provides the best model for an effective exhaustion doctrine. Alternatively, Frisbie constitutes evidence that the
Court was still searching, in the year prior to Brown, for the proper role to be assigned to the state courts in the
criminal justice system. If, having suggested a fact-oriented approach to exhaustion, the Justices chose instead
to develop a blanket doctrine favoring the routine postponement of federal review, then they made entirely the
wrong choice. We ought to go back, find the place where we lost our way, and begin again on the path lighted by
Justice Black's opinion.
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originally intended to operate and promises to frustrate the very interests the
doctrine was designed to protect.
III. A SYNOPSIS OF THE RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. The Birth of the Exhaustion Doctrine
I hardly want, or need, to traverse again the muddy history of postcon-
viction habeas or to join issue on the question whether Congress originally
intended to extend the federal writ to prisoners in state custody-before or
after conviction.5 7 The role the exhaustion doctrine should play depends on
the availability of habeas for state prisoners. The existence of that jurisdiction
today does not, one should hope, rest on the relative success of law office
historians in persuading us that Congressman Lawrence, the draftsman of the
1867 Act, would have approved. 8 It is enough merely to note what everyone
will concede. Since 1867 federal habeas review has been available for the
litigation of at least some federal claims arising at some stages of the proceed-
ings in state court.59 In the first case to reach the Supreme Court, Ex parte
McCardle,6° the new habeas jurisdiction was said to be "of the most com-
prehensive character" and, indeed, so broad that it would be "impossible to
widen." 6 ' That pronouncement prompted the immediate repeal of the section
of the 1867 Act authorizing the Supreme Court to hear appeals. 62 The reasons
for the repeal are familiar and are irrelevant here.63 Without further guidance
from the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts proceeded to issue the writ
to state prisoners in a variety of circumstances. 64 In many cases they acted in
advance of state court litigation of prisoners' federal claims. 65 When, how-
ever, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was restored in 1885,6 and
57. Compare Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1048 (1970)
(presenting the conventional view that the Act was intended to enforce the Civil War amendments by making the
writ available to prisoners in state custody in alleged violation of federal law), with Mayers, The Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867. The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (1965) (arguing that the Act was
designed to protect ex-slaves held in bondage or peonage); compare Bator, supra note 44, at 475 (insisting that
Congress did not intend to establish habeas as a routine collateral remedy), with Schaefer, Federalism and State
Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1956) (arguing the opposing position).
58. See Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L.
REV. 31, 32 (1965) (conceding that "'a purely historical inquiry" can make "'no contribution" to modem
questions regarding the appropriate place of habeas).
59. Even Professor Bator agrees that, whether with justification or not, the Court has always considered
the writ to be available in at least some circumstances. Bator, supra note 44, at 486-87 (discussing with apparent
approval early illustrations of habeas review when state courts failed to provide adequate "corrective
process").
60. 73 U.S. (6 Vall.) 318 (1867).
61. Id. at 325-26.
62. Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44.
63. See generally C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCrION AND REUNION 1864-88, PART 1 (1971); Van Alstyne,
A Critical Guide to E parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973).
64. See Peller, supra note 44, at 623-25 (collecting illustrative cases).
65. E.g., In re Tibarcio Parrott, I F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880); Exparte McCready, 15 F. Cas. 1345 (C.C.E.D.
Va. 1874) (No. 8,732).
66. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the Court was able to return to the matter in Royall, the exhaustion doctrine
was born.67
The petitioner in Royall had been indicted in Virginia for selling a bond
coupon without a license. 68 Without waiting for trial in state court, he re-
quested a writ of habeas corpus from the appropriate federal circuit court,
alleging that the state licensing statute and accompanying taxes violated the
contract clause. The circuit court refused to entertain those federal claims for
want of jurisdiction. 69 The Supreme Court affirmed, but for quite different
reasons. Justice Harlan's opinion for a unanimous bench held explicitly that
the circuit court had jurisdiction in the matter. The basic grant of habeas
jurisdiction, carried forward from the Judiciary Act of 1789, was stated in
language "as broad as could well be employed."- 70 While that Act had recog-
nized an exception for most petitioners held in "gaol,", 7 1 the 1867 statute had
extended the availability of the writ to all prisoners alleging detention in
violation of federal law. 72 Justice Harlan resisted, however, any implication
that the statute required the circuit court to exercise its jurisdiction prior to
trial in state court:
We are of [sic] opinion that while the Circuit Court has the power to do so, and
may discharge the accused in advance of his trial if he is restrained of his liberty in
violation of the national Constitution, it is not bound in every case to exercise such
a power immediately upon application being made for the writ. We cannot suppose
that Congress intended to compel those courts, by such means, to draw to them-
selves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions commenced in
State courts exercising authority within the same territorial limits, where the
accused claims that he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution of the
United States. The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon "to
dispose of the party as law and justice require" does not deprive the court of
discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon
it ....
... [T]his court holds that where a person is in custody, under process from a
State court of original jurisdiction, for an alleged offense against the laws of such
State, and it is claimed that he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, the Circuit Court has a discretion, whether it
will discharge him, upon habeas corpus, in advance of his trial in the court in
which he is indicted; that discretion, however, to be subordinated to any special
circumstances requiring immediate action. 
73
The exhaustion doctrine was established, then, in circumstances in which
arguments for the deferral of federal review were extraordinarily powerful.
67. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
68. 117 U.S. 241, 242-45 (1886).
69. Id. at 245.
70. Id. at 247.
71. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
72. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86. 1 have traced the statutes authorizing various
federal courts and judges to issue the writ. L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 18 (1981).
73. 117 U.S. 241, 251-53 (1866) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 44:393
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
The petitioner in Royall wished to abort trial in state court entirely, thus
depriving the state courts of an opportunity to treat any issues in the case
prior to a federal consideration of his federal defense. Small wonder the Court
balked. The petitioner's position, taken to its logical conclusion and admitting
of no exceptions, would have read the 1867 statute to draw many state crim-
inal cases into the federal forum in the first instance. At the time compar-
atively few defendants had federal defenses to raise, and the primitive state of
fourteenth amendment analysis would surely have trimmed the number of
affected cases. 74 Later, as the Court poured meaning into the due process
clause, the great majority of defendants would have fourteenth amendment
claims and, presumably on that basis, an entitlement to immediate access to
the federal courts.75 In effect, the 1867 Act would have been read to establish
a broad-ranging removal jurisdiction, swallowing up the separate federal
statutes that Congress had apparently intended to identify the circumstances
in which prosecutions begun in state court should be transferred to the federal
forum for trial. 76 Even at that, the Court made it plain that the postponement
of federal review was entirely discretionary. Nothing in the statute at the time
demanded that the federal courts stay their hand. The exhaustion ground was
offered in Royall only as an alternative basis for affirming the judgment
below. It is not at all clear that if the circuit court had entertained the
prisoner's petition and awarded relief the Supreme Court would have re-
versed, demanding exhaustion. 77
Finally, Justice Harlan explicitly recognized that the discretion to post-
pone federal intervention must be subordinated to "special circumstances
requiring immediate action." 78 The statute permitted, but did not demand,
exhaustion, but only in cases in which federal treatment of the merits could be
postponed without undue cost. If "special circumstances" required prompt
litigation in habeas, the federal courts were not free to refuse immediate
adjudication. The illustrations cited in Royall made the Court's meaning plain.
In the past when habeas applicants had alleged that they were held in state
custody for actions taken under some federal authority, or the authority of a
foreign nation, and the disposition of their claims might affect the operations
of the federal government or its relations with other nations, the federal courts
74. See Bator, supra note 44, at 475 (recalling that at the time Royall was decided it was a "well-understood
principle" that "detention pursuant to the judgment of a competent tribunal" was not invalid, even if the
judgment was infected with error); Peller, supra note 44, at 630 (faulting Bator for failing to take sufficient
account of the "narrow scope" of the due process clause during the relevant period).
75. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965); Pye,
The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249 (1968).
76. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963) (speculating that Congress may well have intended the 1867
Act to establish "a remedy almost in the nature of removal from the state to the federal courts of state prisoners'
constitutional contentions") (emphasis in original). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 50.
77. Amsterdam, supra note 50, at 888-89 (pointing out that Royall was not immediately understood to
disallow anticipatory habeas corpus review and that the practice of reversing lower court decisions on the merits
for want of exhaustion developed only later).
78. 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
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had found it appropriate to issue the writ.79 Cases of that kind were controlled
by other federal statutes, enacted previously in response to particularly sensi-
tive problems.80 They illustrated, however, situations in which federal inter-
vention should not be delayed in deference to trial in state court. In those and
"like cases of urgency, ' ' 8' Justice Harlan explained, the 1867 statute would
not countenance delay but, instead, would demand prompt federal review in
habeas.82
B. The Formative Period
In the years immediately following Royall, it appeared that the Court
might not insist that state remedies be exhausted in all, or even most, in-
stances. In three notable cases the Court approved the treatment of federal
claims raised by prisoners in pretrial custody without referring to the exhaus-
tion doctrine.83 The Royall decision was cited, but only during discussion of
the habeas courts' jurisdiction. It was not long, however, before those cases
were explained as having presented "special circumstances" demanding
immediate federal intervention. 84 Far from providing evidence that exhaus-
tion need not be demanded, they came to be regarded as exceptions to a
developing "general rule" that in the absence of "special circumstances" the
federal habeas courts "should not interfere ... until after final action by the
79. Id. at 251-52:
When the petitioner is in custody by State authority for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance
of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court orjudge thereof; or where,
being a subject or citizen of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, he is in custody, under like
authority, for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or
exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign State, or under color
thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations; in such and like cases of
urgency, involving the authority and operations of the General Government, or the obligations of this
country to, or its relations with, foreign nations, the courts of the United States have frequently
interposed by writs of habeas corpus and discharged prisoners who were held in custody under State
authority.
80. Id. The Force Act of 1833, for example, authorized the federal courts to issue the writ in behalf of
federal tax collectors arrested by state authorities, particularly in South Carolina. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57,
§ 3, 4 Stat. 632, 633-34. That enactment is carried forward in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (1976). Similarly, the
Congress enacted legislation in 1842 to extend the writ to state authorities holding foreign nationals in custody.
Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539. See People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) (the case
that provided the catalyst for the enactment). The current version is found at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4) (1976).
81. 117 U.S. 241,251 (1886).
82. This is the sense of the language quoted earlier in the text. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
The Royall Court recognized the habeas courts' discretion to withhold examination of federal claims until the
state courts had had an opportunity to act, but stated squarely that that discretion was "'subordinated" to the
need for "'immediate action" in cases presenting "'special circumstances." See supra text accompanying notes
73 & 78. The federal courts were not permitted discretion to postpone habeas review when prompt action was
required by the circumstances at bar. See Amsterdam, supra note 50, at 901.
83. Wildenhus's Case, 12b U.S. 1 (1887) (concerning a Belgian sailor charged with homicide and held in
state custody pending trial); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. I (1890) (regarding a marshal charged with murdering an
assailant who had attacked Justice Field as he "'rode circuit" in California); In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890)
(concerning a petitioner held in state custody pending trial for an offense that was allegedly within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts).
84. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231,241-42 (1895); accord New 'ork v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89,96-97(1894)
(dealing with the Loney case).
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state courts."' 85 In this, the analysis in Royall was essentially inverted. That
case had held, quite plainly, that prompt habeas treatment of the merits was
mandatory under the 1867 statute if "special circumstances" were shown and
that it was permissible otherwise to postpone federal review. Subsequent
cases held that exhaustion was the "rule ' 86 and that "special circumstances"
must be demonstrated to excuse a federal court's failure to require the peti-
tioner to seek relief first from the state courts.87 From there it was a short step
to require, again as a "general rule," the exhaustion of state appellate proce-
dures 88 and even, in some instances, the extraordinary writs. 89 What had
begun in Royall as a common-sense reluctance to "wrest [a] petitioner from
the custody of... State officers in advance of ... trial in ... State
court" 90 hardened into a "general rule," albeit subject to exceptions, that
federal habeas jurisdiction should await the exhaustion of available state
remedies. 9'
Thereafter the Court had to define more crisply the "special circum-
stances" that would justify a relaxation of the "general rule" demanding
exhaustion. When the Court spoke to that question, it tended to look back to
the original discussion in Royall. There the Court had suggested that cases
touching the operations of the federal government and its relations with other
nations would present sufficient "urgency" to warrant immediate federal
intervention.9 Most early cases in which the Court approved habeas review
prior to trial in state court were of that description. 93 Significantly, however,
the Court did not expressly amend the "special circumstances" formula along
those lines. The Court made no straightforward effort to restrict "special
circumstances" to instances in which federal officials or aliens petitioned for
the writ.94 On several occasions, moreover, the Court took considerable time
to address arguments for "special circumstances" that plainly lacked roots in
national or international affairs. 95 While the Court ultimately concluded on
85. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 466 (1900).
86. Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1901); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 181 (1907).
87. See United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. I, 6-7 (1906) (collecting then-recent decisions in
point).
88. E.g., Exparte Davis, 318 U.S. 412 (1943); Reid v. Jones, 187 U.S. 153 (1902). In truth, the Court had
indicated in Royall that the exhaustion doctrine might extend to appellate remedies, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886),
and in Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516, 518 (1886), decided a month later, the Court applied the Royall analysis in
support of a decision to dismiss on the ground that state appellate remedies remained open.
89. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113-15 (1935); Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U.S. 100, 101 (1894).
90. 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
91. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200,210 (1950) (providing a good discussion of this development). When, for
example, the Court seemed to neglect the matter of state remedies, Justice Harlan, author of the progenitor
opinion, dissented. Hunter v. Wood, 209 U.S. 205, 211 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 83.
94. Looking back on the early cases in Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), the Court summed it up
otherwise. -'[S]pecial circumstances," said Justice Reed for the Court, "'justify departure from rules designed to
regulate the usual case. The exceptions are few but they exist. Other situations may develop." Id. at 210.
95. E.g., Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 292-93 (1898) (considering a prisoner's argument that "special
circumstances' could be found in the state courts' failure to pass on the validity of his federal claim in an earlier
appeal, a two-year delay in bringing him to trial a second time, and the asserted likelihood that, when faced with
the federal claim again, the state courts would deny relief).
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each of those occasions that "special circumstances" had not been demon-
strated, its willingness to treat the arguments suggests that the matter was
more open, and ad hoc, than some have assumed. 96
The elaboration of the "special circumstances" exception to the exhaus-
tion doctrine was complicated by parallel developments regarding the avail-
ability of the habeas writ generally. In a series of confused and confusing
decisions, delivered over a half-century after Royall, several related and
overlapping ideas, often invoked in combination, generally frustrated the pur-
suit of habeas relief by state prisoners. 97 It is extremely difficult to reread
those cases now, with an eye on modern understandings of the nature and
function of federal habeas, and to isolate the Court's treatment of "special
circumstances" within the meaning of Royall from other matters then com-
peting for domination. 9 Those cases presented more than the familiar pattern
of ambiguous precedents that occur over a period of time when fundamental
legal doctrines are shifting, looking toward the day when the Court stops,
takes stock, and reconciles the cases along some preferred, but often pre-
viously unclear, line of analysis. 99 If that were the case, we would face prob-
lems enough. Here the inquiry is more difficult, for the Court's treatment of
matters going to the very existence and function of the habeas jurisdiction
pushed any consideration of the mere timing of federal intervention into the
background. More weighty issues were at the forefront: the recurring insis-
tence that the habeas jurisdiction should, in turn, be limited to cases in which
the state courts lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate;' 0 the contemporary under-
standing that petitioners were detained in violation of due process only if their
96. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 44, at 478 n.87.
97. See generally Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (surveying the Court's cases in the period); Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (distinguishing the several issues treated in those cases).
98. Professor Peller's chief criticism of Bator's work is that the latter fails, in Peller's view, to distinguish
the different matters influencing the Court's decisions in particular cases. See Peller, supra note 44, at 603-63.
99. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977) (recognizing that the Court's decisions reveal not so
much a process of bringing loose ends together as an "historic willingness to overturn or modify" positions
regarding the writ).
100. In Royall the Court had allowed the federal habeas court to stay its hand on the assumption that the
state trial court had jurisdiction to try the case and would, in that posture, consider the petitioner's federal
defense. It is possible that in cases in which the state court lacked jurisdiction, Royall was simply distinguish-
able. Delay in favor of trial in state court could not be justified if the trial court could not validly entertain the
case and thus would have no legitimate occasion to address federal issues. Compare United States exrel. Drury
v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1 (1906) (entertaining but rejecting an argument that habeas should be available before trial
because the state trial court lacked jurisdiction), with Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245 (1913) (insisting that habeas
was not available prior to trial even though the prisoner challenged the validity of the statute underwhich he was
charged in state court). On the other hand, some precedents indicate that, in the period immediately following
Royall, the scope of federal habeas review was limited to jurisdictional error. If that is true, it is equally possible
that applicants who failed to establish that their state courts lacked jurisdiction were denied access to the federal
forum not for want of exhaustion, but for want of habeas power to adjudicate. Cf. Bergemann v. Backer, 157
U.S. 655, 659 (1895) (holding that the trial court had jurisdiction of both the defendant and the offense and had
proceeded under a valid statute, thus the federal habeas court had "no authority to interfere" through habeas
corpus after the prisoner's conviction in state court).
In this vein, for example, Bator and Peller have quarreled over the meaning to be derived from In re Wood,
140 U.S. 278 (1891), in which the petitioner complained of race discrimination in the selection of grand and petit
juries. Professor Bator cites Wood as authority for the view that habeas was available only to challenge
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custody arose from proceedings not in the "regular course of administration"
through the state courts;'0 ' and the concern that an expansive use of habeas
might undercut, or even displace, the Court's more limited jurisdiction on writ
of error.' 02
The Court had first to sort out these matters, to establish habeas as a
general postconviction remedy for the treatment of federal errors alleged to
have been committed in the state courts, before it could address satisfactorily
the matter of the appropriate timing of federal review. The inevitable, of
jurisdictional error. Bator, supra note 44, at 481-82. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court reaffirmed previous
holdings that discriminatory jury selection was invalid (see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879)) but distin-
guished the case at bar, in which the petitioner had not attacked the facial validity of the relevant state statutes
but had alleged only that race discrimination had been practiced in his case. In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 284-86
(1891). That, in turn, was a question within the state trial court's jurisdiction and, according to Justice Harlan,
even an erroneous decision by the court would not have rendered the conviction void, or detention under it
illegal. Id. at 287. Bator concludes that Harlan meant to hold that, because no argument was made that the
conviction in Wood arose from jurisdictional error, thus rendering the judgment void, habeas was unavailable
and the only federal review open to the peititioner was direct appeal to the Supreme Court itself. Bator, supra
note 44, at 481-82.
Professor Peller focuses elsewhere in Justice Harlan's opinion, finding yet more references to Royall, to the
federal habeas courts' power to entertain challenges to the validity of detention in state custody at any time, and
to the discretionary exhaustion doctrine. Pellet, supra note 44, at 638-43 (citing In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278,
289-90 (1891)). He reads Justice Harlan essentially to have proclaimed, rather than denied, the availability of
habeas in Wood. Immediate relief was denied, in Peller's view, only because the petitioner had not raised his
federal claims in a proper and timely manner in state court and thus had failed to exhaust state remedies.
According to Peller, Justice Harlan's distinction between cases in which the facial validity of statutes was
attacked and cases like Wood in which only the application of state law was challenged was addressed to the
question of remedy. Peller, supra note 44, at 639. The Court may have hesitated to accept Wood in habeas, in
which the only relief could be release from custody, rather than on direct review, in which the state court
judgment might have been "reexamined, and reversed, affirmed or modified." In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 287
(1891). By denying the writ, Justice Harlan may have attempted to discourage prisoners such as Wood from
withholding as-applied claims until habeas review in hopes of obtaining outright release. Prisoners attacking the
facial validity of state statutes needed no similar incentive, of course, because they would be entitled to release
irrespective of the federal vehicle by which their claims were examined. Peller, supra note 44, at 638-43. See
also In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1893) (expressing a preference for direct review to have the benefit of
the varied remedies available on appeal); Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 173 (1890) (also expressing concern
over the inflexibility of the relief available in habeas). But see Bator, supra note 44, at 479 n.93 (relying on
Frederich as further authority for the limitation of habeas to jurisdictional error). I will not attempt to decide
who has the better of the argument concerning the meaning of Wood. It is enough merely to say that obscure
opinions of the variety that Wood represents, blurring the analytically distinct questions ofjurisdictional power
and the exhaustion doctrine, produce only ambiguity regarding the Court's true intentions concerning the latter.
101. Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 697-98 (1891); cf. Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403-04 (1900)
(pointing out that the state constitution approved prosecution by information and stating that a Supreme Court
holding that defendants prosecuted without indictment were denied due process "would involve the absurdity
of holding that what the people had declared to be the law was not the law"); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101,
106 (1898) (holding that the habeas writ could not be available unless the conviction was void, and that if the
conviction was not void the "petitioner was not deprived of his liberty without due process of law").
102. Congress did not grant the Court appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases until 1889. Act of Feb. 6, 1889,
ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 656 (granting those convicted of capital crimes "before any court of the United States"
an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court). In earlier years, then, the Court was understandably hesitant to
claim, by way of habeas corpus, the very authority to superintend judgments in criminal cases that Congress had
deliberately withheld. That hesitancy may account for the results in early habeas cases concerning federal
prisoners, in which the Court used language apparently controlling habeas for state prisoners as well. E.g., Ex
parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830) (noting that the Court had "no power to examine the proceedings
[below] on a writ of error," and that it would be "strange" if the Court could nevertheless "substantially
reverse" the judgment by directing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163, 166 (1873) (disclaiming a general power to review criminal judgments "'by the use of the writ of habeas
corpus or otherwise"); see Peller, supra note 44, at 610-16 (citing these and other cases in point).
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course, occurred. The cases managed to blur issues that the Royall Court had
taken pains to keep separate-the federal habeas courts' power to inquire into
the validity of detention in state custody and their discretion to postpone the
exercise of that power. In United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler,'0 3 for
example, the Court explained that the state courts were not to be interfered
with "save in rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency
are shown to exist." 04 That holding was consistent with the application of a
rule of timing. The Court also said, however, that the habeas courts' "power"
was "not unqualified," but was to be "exerted in the exercise of a sound
discretion. "' 05 That assertion linked jurisdiction with the distinguishable
matter of the discretionary exercise of jurisdiction. The lower federal courts
can hardly be blamed for understanding Tyler to bring the discussion full
circle-to make of the exhaustion doctrine the very impediment to federal
jurisdiction that Royall had denied.'06
The Supreme Court hastily responded with its explanatory opinion in Et
parte Hawk:'
07
Ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained under a state
court judgment of conviction for crime will be entertained by a federal court only
after all state remedies available, including all appellate remedies in the state
courts and in this Court by appeal or writ of certiorari; have been exhausted....
The denial of relief to petitioner by the federal courts and judges in this, as in a
number of other cases, appears to have been on the ground that it is a principle
controlling all habeas corpus petitions to the federal courts, that those courts will
interfere with the administration of justice in the state courts only "in rare cases
where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist." . . . To
this, some courts have added the intimation that when the writ is sought by one
held under a state conviction the only remedy ordinarily to be had in a federal
court is by way of application to this Court....
The statement that the writ is available in the federal courts only "in rare
cases" presenting "exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency," often quoted
[from Tyler], was made in a case in which the petitioner had not exhausted his
state remedies and is inapplicable to one in which the petitioner has exhausted his
state remedies, and in which he makes a substantial showing of a denial of federal
right.
103. 269 U.S. 13 (1925).
104. Id. at 17.
105. Id.
106. It is worth noting, for example, that the Tyler opinion included a citation to Glasgow v. Moyer. 225
U.S. 420 (1912), in which a federal prisoner had sought habeas relief after a trial in federal court. 269 U.S. 13. 18
(1925) (citing 225 U.S. 420, 424-25 (1912)). In that context, in which no question of postponing federal review in
deference to adjudication in the courts of any state could arise, Justice McKenna's opinion for the Court seems
clearly to have been addressed to a "'limitation upon the scope" of the writ. 225 U.S. 420,428 (1912). Specifical-
ly, Justice McKenna wrote: "The principle of the cases is the simple one that if a court has jurisdiction of the
case the writ of habeas corpus cannot be employed to re-try the issues, whether of law, constitutional or other.
or of fact.'" Id. at 429. This was not, of course, to enforce an exhaustion requirement, but to commit the federal
prisoner in Glasgow entirely to the jurisdiction of the federal trial court, subject to direct review, without the
promise of collateral review later.
107. 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
[Vol. 44:393
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
Where the state courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of his
contentions, and this Court has either reviewed or declined to review the state
court's decision, a federal court will not ordinarily re-examine upon writ of habeas
corpus the question thus adjudicated.... But where resort to state court
remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions
raised, either because the state affords no remedy, . . . or because in the partic-
ular case the remedy afforded by state law proves in practice unavailable or
seriously inadequate .... a federal court should entertain his petition for habeas
corpus, else he would be remediless.1
8
The Court plainly intended that this language would lay to rest misconcep-
tions regarding the availability of habeas and the proper role of the exhaustion
doctrine.'9 Its effort, however, was only partly successful. The reference in
the first paragraph to direct review in the Supreme Court as being essentially
among the state remedies that must be exhausted not only perpetuated the
myth that the Supreme Court was equipped to correct federal errors in the run
of state criminal cases, but fed speculation that habeas at the district level
might not be available at all after conviction, except, of course, in "excep-
tional circumstances." Yet that was precisely the misconception that Hawk
was intended to correct, as the second and third paragraphs make clear."0
The reference to "full and fair adjudication" in state court raised even more
difficulty. Read literally, that language in the fourth paragraph refuted the
propositions established in the second and third, leaving habeas open only
when state processes did not exist or broke down and not for the routine
reexamination of federal claims to determine whether the state courts had
arrived at correct results."' Talk of "unavailable" or "inadequate" state
remedies, introduced for the first time in Hawk, also suggested a process
model in habeas in which federal review would be forthcoming only when
federal claims were not fairly adjudicated in state court.
Two more decades passed before the notion that direct review in the
Supreme Court must always be sought in advance of an application for habeas
review at the district level was dispelled." 2 Fortunately, the Court's true
108. Id. at 116-18 (citations omitted).
109. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 211 (1950) (conceding as much and noting that the Court had
caused the Hawk opinion to be circulated to prisoners contemplating attacks on state detention).
110. A number of earlier cases had held, quite clearly, that dismissal for want of exhaustion was without
prejudice to a new habeas petition at the district level once state remedies had been pursued. E.g., Minnesota v.
Brundage, 180 U.S. 499, 505 (1901). At the risk of invoking a precedent that has fallen from the Justices' favor
(for other reasons), I should mention that the survey of exhaustion provided in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
419-20 (1963), is explicit on this point.
I 1. In all candor, I have to concede that this portion of the Court's explanation in Hawk reads strangely
like an advance glimpse of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The issue in Hawk was not, however, the
substantive scope of habeas, but the appropriate timing of federal review. The court's decisions immediately
following reveal no intention by this language to anticipate the extraordinary innovations that Stone accom-
plished regarding fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims.
112. Actually, two distinct questions were presented. First, given that the federal district courts enjoyed
power to entertain habeas corpus petitions after conviction in state court, was it necessary for litigants neverthe-
less to ask the Supreme Court to review their state judgments directly before seeking habeas relief at the district
level? See In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 78 (1893) (the federal habeas courts have power to entertain postconvic-
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intentions concerning the scope of review in habeas and its relationship to
exhaustion were clarified sooner. In Wade v. Mayo, I" 3 decided three years
after Hawk, the Court approved a district court's award of habeas relief to a
state prisoner who had first taken his claim of denial of counsel to the highest
state court and had received an unfavorable judgment on the merits. It was
not suggested that the proceedings in state court had not been "full and fair"
or that state remedies had been "unavailable" or "inadequate." The state
courts had treated the claim fairly, but had simply reached the wrong conclu-
sion. " 4 The view that the exhaustion doctrine recognized the state court as
the appropriate forum in which "all the problems incident to a state criminal
prosecution" should be resolved, save in "the most exceptional cases," was
relegated to the dissent." 5 The availability of habeas corpus as a postconvic-
tion remedy having thus been settled, the exhaustion doctrine emerged, in
isolation from other matters, as the rule of timing it was and had been since
Royall. Attention to whether state court litigation had been "full and fair"
subsided, and the question whether state remedies were "unavailable" or
"inadequate" merged with the more familiar issue whether "special circum-
stances" justified prompt federal intervention. That understanding of Hawk
survived and, in due course, was written into the statute books.
116
C. The "Codification" in Section 2254
The very existence of the federal writ as a sequel to state court litigation
of federal claims generated widespread controversy during the 1940s."17 Not
only were state judges disturbed that their judgments would be subject to
review by trial-level federal habeas courts, but many federal judges resisted
the function assigned to them. "8 If the exhaustion doctrine cut any figure at
tion applications, but "in the absence of special facts and circumstances" it was the "better practice" to require
convicted prisoners to seek direct review in the Supreme Court). The Court gave an affirmative answer in Darr
v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214-17 (1950), but later reversed itself in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-3S (1963).
Second, ifa prisoner did seek direct review in the Supreme Court and certiorari was denied, what effect, if any,
should be given that denial in subsequent habeas proceedings? The Justices also quarreled over this second
question, but ultimately adopted Justice Frankfurter's position. The denial of certiorari constitutes only a
decision not to decide and is entitled to no weight when a disappointed petitioner turns to habeas corpus
thereafter. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 488-97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.) (expressing the majority's position on
the issue). The reasons are self-evident; they are treated at length in Brown and in Justice Frankfurter's dissent
in Darr, 339 U.S. 200, 219-38 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
113. 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
114. Judge Parker apparently hoped to restrict Wade to something far less significant. See Parker, Limiting
the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 177-78 (1949) (reading the case to contemplate habeas review only
in "special circumstances"). That effort was, however, unsuccessful. See infra notes 117-31 and accompanying
text.
115. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 694 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
116. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. The Court described these developments at some length in
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210-11 (1950).
117. See Goodman, Use and Abuse ofthe Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313 (1948); Parker, Limiting
the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949).
118. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rooney v. Ragen, 173 F.2d 668 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 337 U.S. 961
(1949); Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947). In 1954 the large majority of state attorneys general
joined in an unsuccessful attempt to win a judgment that postconviction habeas was itself unconstitutional.
United States ex rel. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 851 (1954).
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all in the debates, it tended to mitigate concerns on both sides by deferring
federal review until after the state courts had had an opportunity to act.
In 1942 the Judicial Conference of the United States appointed a com-
mittee, chaired by Judge John J. Parker, to investigate the relevant issues." 9
That committee returned the following year with two proposals, one of which
would virtually have eliminated the federal courts' power to entertain peti-
tions from state prisoners. 2 0 The Conference adopted the jurisdictional bill
with amendments. 12' Shortly thereafter, however, Congress' consideration of
the Revision of the Judicial Code outstripped efforts to deal with habeas
corpus alone. While the proposed Revision embraced some of the provisions
included in the committee's bills, it did not take aim at the jurisdictional
power of the federal courts. 2 2 Nevertheless, sensing that an independent
course might prove futile, the committee acquiesced and urged the Confer-
ence to join the larger effort. 23 The Conference approved the tactic at its 1947
session and, for the moment, it appeared that a frontal assault on the habeas
jurisdiction was abandoned. Indeed, the Revision's essential objective was
not to alter habeas corpus law as it had developed in the Court's decisions,
but to "codify" those decisions and to establish procedures for giving effect
to the value judgments reflected in them. 2 4
As often happens in law and politics, however, surface placidity con-
cealed feverish activity below. At the same 1947 meeting, the Conference
adopted two proposed amendments to the Revision bill, offered by the Parker
committee.'- In one, ostensibly intended only to "codify" the exhaustion
doctrine, Judge Parker hoped effectively to reintroduce the jurisdictional bar-
rier to the federal forum that he had failed to achieve straightforwardly. Once
again, the exhaustion doctrine was merged with the idea of preclusion. The
bill provided, first, that state prisoners must exhaust "available" and
"adequate" state remedies before seeking federal review in habeas. In that, it
was unremarkable, given the Court's conclusion in Hawk that those same
matters were relevant to the existence of "special circumstances" warranting
119. See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 173 (1949).
120. The Committee's recommendations are discussed in JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT
JUDGES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 22-24 (1943).
121. The Conference adopted a recommendation that a specific bill be enacted by the Congress, with three
judges, including Judge Parker, appointed as a committee on style with authority to submit proposals for
revisions to the individual Conference members. The proposed bill would have abrogated federal habeas corpus
for state prisoners "unless it shall appear that the petitioner has no adequate remedy by habeas corpus, writ of
error coram nobis or otherwise in the courts of the state." Id. at 23. The phrase "no adequate remedy" was
explicitly defined as the "absence of state corrective process or existence of exceptional circumstances, render-
ing such process unavailable to protect his [a prisoner's] rights." Id.
122. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (examining the relevant evidence).
123. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE 19-20 (1947).
124. See generally H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A177-AI80 (1947).
125. There were, of course, other "procedural" proposals during this period, first from the committee and
then from the Judicial Conference. Those matters are not pertinent to the present discussion. See generally
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216,
230-31 & nn.73-75 (1948).
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prompt federal review. 16 Next the bill provided that prisoners would not be
deemed to have complied with the exhaustion requirement if they had "the
right under the law of the state to raise the question presented by any avail-
able procedure." 127 In that, the bill was either redundant or misleading. Judge
Parker plainly intended the latter. He and the other draftsmen understood that
in most states prisoners could theoretically seek postconviction relief through
some common-law remedy over and over again. Accordingly, they would
never be able to demonstrate that no available procedure existed for raising
their claims in state court. In every instance yet another, albeit futile, request
for the state writ of habeas corpus or coram nobis would be available. The
effect of the amendment, in Judge Parker's own words, would be to "elim-
inate, for all practical purposes, the right to apply to the lower federal courts
for habeas corpus in all states in which successive applications may be
made ... to the state courts." 1
2 8
Although Congress ultimately embraced the language urged by the
Judicial Conference, the sparse legislative history provides no basis for con-
cluding that it intended to adopt Judge Parker's understanding of the bill's
practical effect. Indeed, in Brown v. Allen 2 9 the Justices were unanimous in
rejecting Judge Parker's view expressly. '3 Justice Reed, speaking for the
Court, stated: "We do not believe Congress intended to require repetitious
applications to state courts." 131 Brown was firmly grounded in the Justices'
recognition that the exhaustion doctrine was not a device for cutting off the
federal forum to state prisoners, but was only a rule of timing. That, of course,
was precisely the view the Court had taken in Frisbie, decided prior to
Brown. 132 It was the view taken in Noia and other decisions of the Warren
era.1 33 And, in all fairness, it is the view usually expressed by the Burger
Court. 134 The difficulty is that the Justices are not always careful to make the
discretionary nature of the doctrine clear, and, regarding its practical applica-
tion, they make such a "fetish" '35 of exhaustion that once again it threatens to
frustrate collateral review at any time. 136
126. See supra text accompanying note 108.
127. H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
128. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 176 (1949).
129. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
130. Id. at 448 n.3.
131. Id.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
133. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418-20 (1963); see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
134. E.g., Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332 (1978) (per curiam) (finding the exhaustion doctrine satisfied and
habeas review available even though the state supreme court had ignored a federal claim raised by the petitioner
in brief); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (describing the exhaustion of state remedies as a -condition
precedent to the invocation of federal judicial relief").
135. 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4264, at 653-54
(1978).
136. See infra notes 148-85 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE TODAY:
AN APPRAISAL AND CRITIQUE
A. The Effect of "Codification"
The relationship between the exhaustion doctrine as it developed in the
wake of Royall and the pertinent provisions of the 1948 Revision, subsections
2254(b)-(c), is problematic. For the most part, the statute has been read
merely to acknowledge the pre-existing, judge-made rule. The reviser's note,
for example, states that "[t]his new section is declaratory of existing law as
affirmed by the Supreme Court.. .. " ' One could plausibly construe the
statute to occupy the field, demanding exhaustion only in those cases and
under those circumstances described in its text. I suspect that at least some
Justices are tempted in that direction. Strict focus on and enforcement of the
terms of the statute would not only shift responsibility for exhaustion doctrine
cases to the legislative branch, but would link the doctrine, at least super-
ficially, with congressional authority to affect the federal courts' juris-
diction. 38 Rigid rules respecting exhaustion might be justified on a statutory
ground even if, judged in light of the policies the Court has identified, those
same rules would be vulnerable. One budding example, together with the
decided cases I will treat below, should suffice to make the point.
Read closely, section 2254(b) provides only that applications for habeas
relief shall not be granted in the absence of exhaustion. 39 The Court has
enforced that directive vigorously, insisting on exhaustion even when pris-
oners' entitlement to relief is "clear." 40 The statute says nothing, however,
about exhaustion in cases in which habeas relief is denied. The Supreme
Court has not yet addressed the issue, but several lower courts have con-
cluded that frivolous petitions can be dismissed on the merits whether or not
state remedies have been exhausted. 14' As a practical matter, state authorities
will probably not be greatly offended that the exhaustion doctrine is relaxed,
137. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. Al80 (1947) (referring explicitly to Hawk).
138. Cf. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (thejurisdiction of the lower federal courts is limited to
that prescribed by statute). Even the most vigorous proponents of federal habeas have generally conceded that
much of the present framework is the product of statute. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 515-29 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508-10 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.). I need not and,
therefore, choose not to consider the question whether the Constitution itself contemplates the availability of
the writ in the federal forum. Compare Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605,
with Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 335
(1952).
139. See supra note 1; see also Stamper v. Baskerville, 531 F. Supp. 1122, 1132 (E.D. Va. 1982).
140. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam).
14 1. Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1983); Collins v. Housewright, 664 F.2d 181, 183 (8th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1982); Grieco v. Hall, 641 F.2d 1029, 1036 (1st Cir. 1981); cf. De Martino
v. Weidenburner, 616 F.2d 708, 710 n.I (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming the denial of relief on the merits and thus falling
to "reach" the exhaustion issue). The Fifth Circuit has long taken this view, but has more recently worried that
the Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), discussed below, makes the dismissal of
unexhausted claims inappropriate. Caldwell v. Line, 679 F.2d 494,497 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding it unnecessary
to decide the question).
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if federal relief is denied summarily. The dismissal of habeas applications
probably does generate less friction between the two systems than the award
of habeas relief. 142 It may be possible, for example, to deny relief summarily
without calling for a response from the state's attorney or in any similar way
disrupting contemporaneous state proceedings. 143 Nevertheless, the mere fact
of early federal adjudication plainly subordinates the state courts' interest in
addressing federal issues. If the Supreme Court parses the language of section
2254(b) and concludes that failure to exhaust state remedies may be over-
looked so long as prisoners lose, but that state courts must be consulted
before prisoners can be permitted to win, it must do so in the teeth of a key
policy underlying the exhaustion doctrine the Court established in Royall.'44
Whatever the statute's potential as a vehicle for establishing rules to the
detriment of early federal adjudication, the Court is most unlikely to restrict
the exhaustion doctrine to what Congress has mandated. If section 2254 were
understood to occupy the field, exhaustion would not be required in the very
cases in which the arguments for it are most powerful. The statute speaks only
to cases in which petitioners attack custody pursuant to a state court judg-
ment. It has nothing to say about the timing of federal intervention prior to
conviction. If the Court were to hold that the exhaustion doctrine is entirely
captured in the statute, the federal courts would be free, even compelled, to
adjudicate prior to, or in the midst of, trial, when the state's interests in
orderly administration and an opportunity to pass on federal claims are at
their height. 45 The Justices have no intention of abandoning the exhaustion
doctrine established in Royall, itself concerning a request for habeas relief in
advance of trial. 146 They do not feel bound by the statute, but consider them-
selves free to examine exhaustion doctrine problems by reference not only to
section 2254 and its legislative history, but to the underlying policies identified
142. In his barely temperate lecture on the subject, Judge Cooke has proposed that "-[the most incessant
abrader ofjudicial feelings may be in the overturn of the deliberative judgment of the highest court ofa state by a
single federal trial court judge." Cooke, Waste Not, Wait Not-A Consideration of Federal and State Jurisdic-
tion, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 900 (1981) (emphasis added).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4 (1976) (permitting the district judge to make a preliminary appraisal of
petitions and to dismiss them summarily, without calling for an answer or other pleading from the respondent, if
they plainly lack merit).
144. In this vein, the Fourth Circuit has flatly rejected the suggestion that states' attorneys may enter
conditional waivers of the exhaustion doctrine by which they acquiesce in immediate federal habeas review but
reserve their "right" to insist that claims be put to the state courts later if the federal court finds those claims to
be meritorious. Harding v. North Carolina, 683 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1982). Federal adjudication, not merely
adverse federal outcome, touches the comity rationale of the exhaustion doctrine. Nevertheless, the Reagan
Administration has proposed legislation that would permit the federal habeas courts to deny relief on the merits
regardless of exhaustion. The Administration's Proposed Reforms in Habeas Corpus Procedures (March 4,
1982), reprinted in Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982); see S. 217, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 402 (1983) (incorporating the
Administration's proposals). I have criticized that proposal elsewhere. See Yackle, The Reagan Adminis-
tration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IOwA L. REV. 609, 635-36 n.120 (1983).
145. But see Amsterdam, supra note 50, at 835, 902-03 (arguing that exhaustion is less justifiable prior to
trial-before a state court has come to a judgment that a federal habeas court might effectively set at naught).
146. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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in their own decisions. 47 That being true, the same freedom permits move-
ment in either direction. The statute neither prevents the habeas courts from
requiring exhaustion in pretrial cases, nor requires them to disregard exhaus-
tion in cases in which relief is denied. In both instances the federal courts are
charged, as they have been since Royall, to orchestrate the timing of their
treatment of federal claims according to prudence and sound discretion, keep-
ing in mind the delicate balance of interests at stake in every case. In the long
history of the exhaustion doctrine, Frisbie presents the best illustration of the
way in which the courts should exercise that discretion.
B. Renewed Talk of Jurisdiction
The Court has not abandoned the basic premise regarding exhaustion in
habeas. When called upon to do so, the Justices acknowledge that the federal
courts have jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions at any time and that the
doctrine is a device for choosing the appropriate occasion for habeas re-
view. 148 Nevertheless, some recent cases can be read to undercut that under-
standing, feeding speculation that the doctrine does affect the federal courts'
power to adjudicate. While the Court has occasionally approved the practice
of holding habeas petitions on the federal docket while petitioners pursue
state remedies, 149 it stated explicitly in Slayton v. Smith'50  that the better
disposition is outright dismissal, without prejudice to a new petition when the
exhaustion doctrine has been satisfied.' 5 ' Dismissal, of course, is associated
with jurisdictional error. 152
Then, too, the Court has repeatedly vacated judgments on the merits on
the stated ground that the lower courts misapplied the exhaustion doctrine. In
Picard v. Connor 53 the Court dismissed for want of clear identification of a
147. It is true, of course, that the original draft of the bill that became the Judical Code included language
extending the habeas jurisdiction to petitioners held under "the authority of a State officer." H.R. 3214, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The Congress adopted an amendment restricting the statutory exhaustion doctrine to
prisoners detained pursuant to a state court judgment. It appears that the intention was to avoid any potential
difficulty should federal officers seek habeas relief from state court prosecution for actions taken in their official
capacity. S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1948). The result is ambiguity. To the extent that the
reviser's note interprets the new statute to embrace only thejudge-made doctrine as set forth in Hawk, see supra
note 137 and accompanying text, it appears there was no intention to change, or in any way restrict, that
doctrine legislatively. At the same time, to the extent Congress found it necessary to confine the statute to
postjudgment cases to avoid requiring exhaustion in pretrial cases concerning federal officers, it seems that
some change was contemplated. Prior law had not required exhaustion in cases of that kind, finding in them
•"special circumstances" justifying immediate federal intervention. See supra note 83. Professor Amsterdam has
treated these materials at greater length, and I defer to his discussion. Amsterdam, supra note 50, at 890-91
nn.416-17.
148. E.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80-81 (1977).
149. E.g., Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970); Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282, 287 (1970).
150. 404 U.S. 53 (1971) (per curiam).
151. Id. at 54. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963) (pointing out the obvious--if prisoners were not
permitted to return to the federal forum after complying with the exhaustion doctrine "a rule of timing would
become a rule circumscribing the power of the federal courts on habeas").
152. See. e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
153. 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
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federal claim in state court, even though the essential character of the claim
had not become plain until the case reached the Supreme Court. Later in
Pitchess v. Davis'54 a per curiam explained Picard as having held that ex-
haustion is a "precondition" or "prerequisite" to federal review in habeas. 55
These recent cases evidence a "reluctance" on the part of the Court to
"backstop" the exhaustion judgments of the lower federal courts. 5 6 Rather
than permit the lower courts the discretion contemplated in Frisbie, the
Justices seem poised to review the doctrine's application to ensure that it is
not relaxed.
Language in other recent cases suggests that the Court is infusing even
more rigidity into the doctrine. In Sumner v. Mata 157 the matter of exhaustion
was not squarely at issue. The question was whether the circuit court below
should have attached a statutory presumption of correctness to state court
findings of primary fact, pursuant to subsection 2254(d).'58 The close prox-
imity of that section to subsections 2254(b)-(c), which codify the exhaustion
doctrine, could not, however, be missed. The prisoner in Mata argued that
subsection 2254(d) should not control, because the warden had not raised the
statute in a timely fashion below and, thus, should forfeit reliance on it on
appeal. At oral argument Justice Rehnquist proposed that the "phraseology"
of the statute made it "practically a part of the habeas corpus cause of
action." 5 9 Continuing, he asked, "Isn't it jurisdictional?" '60 Then, in his
opinion for the Court, he addressed the prisoner's "abandonment" conten-
tion forthrightly:
Whether or not the [warden] specifically directed the Court of Appeals' attention
to § 2254(d) makes no difference as to the outcome of this case. The present
codification of the federal habeas statute is the successor to "the first [C]ongres-
sional grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts," . . . and the 1966 amendments
embodied in § 2254(d) were intended by Congress as limitations on the exercise of
that jurisdiction .... [I]t is the duty of this [C]ourt to see to it that the jurisdic-
tion of the [district court] ... is not exceeded." ' 6'
This language is ambiguous, referring as it does to the "exercise" of jurisdic-
tion rather than to jurisdiction itself.162 And we must not forget that the
subject under discussion is subsection 2254(d), not subsections 2254(b)-(c). It
154. 421 U.S. 482 (1975).
155. Id. at 486-87.
156. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 281 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
157. 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
158. Subsection 2254(d) provides:
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the
merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the
applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct,
unless [one or more prescribed circumstances is demonstrated] ....
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976).
159. 28 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4138 (Dec. 24, 1980).
160. Id.
161. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547-48 n.2 (1981) (citations omitted).
162. See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939), quoted supra note 1.
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seems plain, however, that Justice Rehnquist meant to explain why the
warden's argument should be entertained despite his procedural default below.
The explanation, evidently, was that the argument grounded in subsection
2254(d) went to the courts' power to adjudicate and, thus, could be raised at any
time. 163
The available bases of distinguishing Mata did not dissuade the warden in
Rose v. Lundy'64 from relying on Justice Rehnquist's language to propose that
the exhaustion doctrine is a "jurisdictional limitation upon federal habeas
review." 165 Conceding that in Royall the doctrine had been a matter of discre-
tion, the warden contended that the 1948 codification "translated" that dis-
cretion "into a limitation of power."'66 That position attracted attention at
oral argument in the following exchange:
Mr. Zimmerman: The exhaustion requirement, we submit, operates as a pre-
requisite to habeas review, a precondition to habeas review. It has never been,
since 1948, anyway, a discretionary tool.
Justice Brennan: Well, didn't Picard say that? Didn't Picard hold that?
Mr. Zimmerman: I don't recall-
Justice Brennan: That it was not a discretionary rule? I thought Picard held
that. No?
Mr. Zimmerman: That it was not a discretionary-
Justice Brennan: Yes, that the exhaustion requirement is a requirement,
period. 167
Here again, there is ambiguity. While counsel may have meant to argue that
the exhaustion doctrine is jurisdictional, he only quoted Pitchess.'68 When
Justice Brennan seemed to agree, he may have understood only that exhaus-
tion is generally to be demanded and that the district courts stand to be
reversed when they overlook a failure to exhaust in the absence of "special
circumstances." In this regard, it is worth pointing out that counsel for the
prisoner in Lundy disagreed with the view that exhaustion is jurisdictional and
requested an opportunity to file a supplemental brief if the Justices intended
to reach that question. 69 No one pursued the matter further, and there is no
163. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
164. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
165. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3.
166. Id. at 4.
167. Oral Argument Transcript at 24. 1 rely upon Mr. Zimmerman's memory for the identification of Justice
Brennan as the questioner in this exchange.
168. See supra text accompanying note 155.
169. Oral Argument Transcript at 32-33 (argument of Mr. Smith):
Now, the basis of the proposition put forth by Petitioner, at least in his brief filed in this Court, was
comity. In the reply brief filed in this Court, he stated that the basis of this proposition was jurisdic-
tional, that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to hear petitions which contained exhausted and
unexhausted claims.
I don't believe that this is the case. If the Court wishes to pursue that matter, this is the case in
which it is to be raised. If it is the case, and if the Court feels so, I feel that both sides should be
permitted to brief that jurisdictional issue.
Id. The Court's ultimate opinion in Lundy did not address the "'jurisdiction" issue, and, while the decision has
surely imported additional rigidity into habeas law, it has not been read to make the exhaustion of state remedies
"'jurisdictional" after all. See Niziolek v. Ashe, 694 F.2d 282, 285 (Ist Cir. 1982); Washington v. Strickland, 693
F.2d 1243, 1248-49 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982).
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
mention of it in the Court's opinion. Still, the doubts persist. At a minimum,
even Justice Brennan takes the position that exhaustion is ordinarily a "re-
quirement" and that the district courts are not free to exercise discretion
without appellate supervision. It may be a short and practical, if not a theo-
retical, step from that position to a holding that exhaustion goes to the courts'
fundamental power to adjudicate.
Other recent cases outside the habeas field can be cited on the point. In
Webb v. Webb' 70 Justice White's opinion for the Court argued that the "prin-
cipal [sic] of comity" behind the "properly-raised-federal-question" doctrine
is "similar" to that behind the exhaustion doctrine in habeas.' 7' The require-
ment that litigants "properly raise" federal claims in state court before they
can present them on direct review in the Supreme Court is, of course, juris-
dictional. 72 In Webb the Court found that the petitioner had not raised her
claim properly below and thus dismissed the writ of certiorari "for want of
jurisdiction." 73 In Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary 174
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court held that the "principle of comity"
underlying the Tax Injunction Act "bars" the federal courts from awarding
damages in civil rights suits attacking allegedly unconstitutional state tax
assessments.'75 The attempt to find a jurisdictional defect in McNary elicited
a rejoinder from Justice Brennan, who reminded the Court that Congress
bears responsibility for establishing the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Justice Brennan worried aloud that the majority's approach to comity con-
stituted an "abdication" of the federal habeas courts' responsibility to
operate "within their assigned jurisdiction in accordance with established
principles respecting the prudent exercise of equitable power.1"'76 Yet even he
was obscure in referring to the role played by comity in habeas corpus:
"While current habeas jurisdiction is wholly a statutory matter ... comity
surely played a part in the development of the exhaustion requirement....
But the judicial creation of that requirement reflected no usurpation ofjudicial
power. Issuance of the Great Writ was historically regarded as a matter of
equitable discretion. '' 7 It is possible to read this passage as an attempt to
explain the discretion exercised by the federal habeas courts on the basis of
the equitable nature of the common-law writ rather than the essential character
of the exhaustion doctrine.
7 1
The loose language in these cases is perplexing. Still, I am not yet per-
suaded that a majority of the Justices mean, essentially, to overrule Royall.
170. 451 U.S. 493 (1981).
171. Id. at 500.
172. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969) (collecting the authorities).
173. 451 U.S. 493, 502 (1981).
174. 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
175. Id. at 107.
176. Id. at 117, 133 (Brennan, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 121 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
178. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (noting that the writ "has traditionally been regarded as
governed by equitable principles"); accord Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 478 n. II (1976).
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Perhaps the Court wishes to signal the lower courts that the exhaustion doc-
trine is discretionary only in the definitional sense. The Supreme Court itself
will employ discretion in establishing both the doctrine and certain exceptions
to it. The task of the lower courts, then, is not to exercise discretion again in the
circumstances of the individual case, but to apply the doctrine, including its
exceptions, as it is described in the Court's precedents.' 79 I would prefer a more
flexible approach than that described-one that contemplates an ad hoc ap-
praisal at the district level. 80 Yet anything would seem preferable to the
erection of a jurisdictional bar. All the same, I cannot fault some lower courts
for concluding that the Court has precisely that in mind. '8' Nor is it surprising
that many courts insist upon raising the exhaustion question sua sponte, the
manner appropriate for jurisdictional defects, even when counsel for the re-
spondent overlooks,'82 concedes, 8 or waives 184 the matter. Those decisions
are ill-advised. And certainly they cannot rest upon the unexamined proposi-
tion that comity is owed to the state courts, rather than the states themselves,
179. See Amsterdam, supra note 50, at 889 (reading the cases decided soon after Royall to have established
that the "discretion" in habeas cases would be exercised by the Supreme Court and not by trial level judges on a
case-by-case basis).
180. See supra part II; cf. Amsterdam, supra note 50, at 889 n.408 (recognizing that in Frisbie the Court
showed some deference to the circuit court below, but apparently viewing that case as an aberration and
concluding that "on the whole" it is "apparent" that the "discretion" contemplated in Royall is for the "federal
judicial system" rather than the "trial judge").
181. Accord LaBruna v. Marshal, 665 F.2d 439, 442 (2d Cir. 1981); Franklin v. State, 662 F.2d 1337,
1347-48 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. United States ex rel. Clauserv. Shadid, 677 F.2d 591,594(7th Cir. 1982) (instructing
the district court to dismiss for want of "jurisdiction" when the only flaw was a failure to exhaust); Chancery
Clerk of Chickasaw County v. Wallace, 646 F.2d 151, 158 (5th Cir. 1981) (referring to the exhaustion doctrine as
"jurisdictional"). But see Morgan v. Wainwright, 676 F.2d 476,477 n. 1 (1 th Cir.) (clarifying that the doctrine is
not "jurisdictional"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 380 (1982).
182. E.g., Wilson v. Fogg, 571 F.2d 91, 94 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978); cf. Campbell v. Crist, 647 F.2d 956, 957 (9th
Cir. 1981) (the circuit "may consider whether state remedies have been exhausted even if the state does not raise
the issue"); Davis v. Campbell, 608 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1979) (an "inadvertent" failure to raise the exhaus-
tion question would not prevent the court itself from insisting that the prisoner return to state court).
183. E.g., Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 867, 868 (9th Cir. 1982). The best illustration may be Zicarelli v. Gray,
543 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1976), in which counsel for the respondent had originally argued that the prisoner had failed
to exhaust state remedies but, after losing on that question at the district level, changed his position on appeal.
At oral argument counsel explained that he had reexamined the record and concluded "in all fairness" that the
prisoner's claim had, indeed, been presented to the highest state court. Id. at 471 n.20. Nevertheless, the circuit
rejected that concession, raised the exhaustion question sua sponte, and determined the matter against the
prisoner. Id. at 470-75.
184. United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86, 96 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928
(1978); United States exrel. Sostre v. Festa, 513 F.2d 1313, 1314 n.l (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975);
Needel v. Scafati, 412 F.2d 761, 765-466 (Ist Cir. 1969); see Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 237 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981)
(the state can "waive" exhaustion only if "the interest of justice so requires"); accord Ventura v. Cupp, 690
F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (quoting Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 237 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981)); cf.
Baxter v. Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030, 1033 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting but failing to decide whether the state has
"power" to waive exhaustion), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085 (1981). Occasionally a court applies a doctrine of
clear statement to the matter, as though it will consider a waiver only when it is undoubtedly intended. E.g.,
Strader v. Allsbrook, 656 F.2d 67, 68 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (recognizing that counsel had stated in a
pleading below that the exhaustion doctrine had been satisfied, but refusing to accept that pleading as either
"conclusive" or as a "'waiver"); United States ex rel. Isaac v. Franzen, 531 F. Supp. 1086, 1089 (N.D. 111. 1982)
(taking the position that only an explicit waiver or a considerable investment of federal resources will justify a
district court in neglecting the exhaustion doctrine). See generally United States ex rel. Lockett v. Illinois Parole
and Pardon Bd., 600 F.2d 116, 117-18 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (noting the divided authorities on the waiver
issue).
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so that duly-appointed states' attorneys are without authority to acquiesce in
federal review in the absence of exhaustion. 18 5 Nevertheless, given the
Supreme Court's recent enigmatic signals, one can only expect that the lower
courts should begin to treat the exhaustion doctrine as jurisdictional after all.
C. A Tendency Toward Rigidity
Not only does the present Court demand that state remedies be ex-
hausted in every case, but it increasingly prefers the establishment of inflex-
ible rules, which, when applied without reference to the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case at bar, threaten to undermine, rather than serve, the
doctrine's objectives. I have already mentioned the Court's insistence upon
exhaustion even when it is "clear" that prisoners are entitled to relief and,
accordingly, that they will suffer unconstitutional detention while they pre-
sent their claims to the state courts. In Duckworth v. Serrano'16 the Court
recognized that the exhaustion doctrine holds only that state remedies must
"normally" be pursued prior to federal review in habeas.' 7 Yet in short order
185. See Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 237 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981) (accepting the argument); United States ex
rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86,96 (3d Cir. 1977) (making the argument), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928(1978).
Because the state courts themselves have no apparent way to enter a waiver, the suggestion that the state's
attorney cannot do so amounts to a proposal that waivers simply cannot be entertained. While one may argue
that a state can decide for itself who will be authorized to speak in such matters, it is inadmissible to contend that
when a state officer has been duly appointed to do so the federal courts should refuse to listen and should insist
instead upon hearing from those who cannot respond. Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1982)
(Higginbotham, J., concurring). Even if one concedes the specious point that states' attorneys do not and
cannot represent the interests of state courts, and I certainly do not, comity is owed to governmental units-that
is, the states themselves. Judge Gibbons' dissent in Trantino, 563 F.2d 86, 100-05 (3d Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring and dissenting), is, I think, unanswerable. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490-92 (1973)
(making it clear that comity is owed to both state administrative bodies and state courts); cf. United States v.
Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 370-71 (1980) (understanding comity as partly an expression of deference to state
legislatures); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 443 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit J.)
(invoking comity regarding state policy expressed by an administrative agency); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,
416 (1979) (using the term in referring to the asserted immunity of a state to suit in the courts of another state).
Some lines, of course, may be drawn. It is one thing, for example, to permit counsel to concede exhaustion
when the issue is close, thus rescuing the federal habeas court from a troublesome inquiry into obscure state
procedures and postconviction remedies of questionable availability. It may be quite another to accept counsel's
waiver, to take the extreme case, in the absence of any contention whatever that the state courts have been
given an opportunity to address a prisoner's claims. Nevertheless, since a waiver is entirely proper in these
nonjurisdictional circumstances, it hardly seems worthwhile to identify distinctions that make no practical
difference. The courts routinely refer to concessions and waivers as essentially interchangeable. E.g., Montague
v. Vinzant, 643 F.2d 657, 659 n.l (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that counsel had "conceded" satisfaction of the
exhaustion doctrine and in the same breath recognizing that the circuits are divided on the question whether the
state may "waive" the matter). Regarding inadvertent failure to raise the exhaustion question, it seems only
reasonable and just to follow the ordinary appellate practice of entertaining only questions properly preserved
below by either party. See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text (collecting the counter-authorities on this
and previous questions). The Supreme Court has referred, albeit obliquely, to these problems, but has suggested
no interest in resting its analysis on the differences, if any, among a mere failure to assert exhaustion, a
concession that the doctrine has been satisfied, and an outright waiver. See Estellev. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534,
536 n.2 (1975) (mentioning that the district court had decided the exhaustion question in the prisoner's favor and
that the warden had not raised it again in the court of appeals); Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59, 60 (1974)
(noting that the warden had "conceded" that state remedies had been exhausted).
186. 454 U.S. I (1981) (per curiam).
187. Id. at 3 (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886)).
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the per curiam announced that exceptions can be made under section 2254
"only if there is no opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the
corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain
relief." ,88 In all other cases, the federal courts are apparently "obligated" to
dismiss. 1
89
On the facts presented in Serrano, perhaps the Court's disposition was
understandable. The prisoner had made no attempt to litigate his federal claim
in state court and had actually raised it for the first time in the Ninth Circuit.
That court had reached the merits and had awarded relief "in the interest of
judicial economy." '0 The Supreme Court could not approve that action with-
out discarding the exhaustion doctrine entirely. Immediate attention to the
merits often conserves judicial resources, especially if the proper result is
apparent. The exhaustion doctrine tolerates some measure of inefficiency in
deference to legitimate state interests. Moreover, if the constitutional viola-
tion is genuinely clear, the state courts can, perhaps, be relied upon to award
relief just as quickly as would a federal court in habeas.'9 ' On a practical level,
a different result in Serrano might have encouraged ever-optimistic prisoners
to bypass the state courts routinely in hopes of persuading the federal courts
of the obvious merit of their claims. That, in turn, would waste precious time.
The available data demonstrate that few habeas claims promise to be that
clear, and the likely result in most instances would be an order demanding
exhaustion. 92
The difficulty arises in Serrano when the Court leaves the facts of that
case and implies that the relative clarity of a prisoner's right to relief has no
bearing whatsoever on the proper application of the exhaustion doctrine. If
prisoners make some effort at exhaustion and present at least an arguable case
for compliance, and if it appears that the state courts have concluded that no
relief is warranted, then surely it is reasonable to consider the perceived merit
of the claim before bucking the case back to the state forum in knee-jerk
fashion. In cases in which the federal habeas court anticipates that relief will
be awarded when the merits are reached, it seems unduly harsh to condemn
prisoners to further, unconstitutional confinement if, and this is important, a
188. 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam).
189. Id. at 4.
190. Id. at 2.
191. The point would hardly hold in every case. When, for example, what is clear about a federal claim is
that some state statute or settled practice is unconstitutional, the prisoner can expect to obtain relief only after
getting past the trial and intermediate-level appellate courts, which cannot be expected to challenge those
statutes or practices whatever their true opinions, and finding his or her way to the state appellate court with
responsibility for making so momentous a decision. Even then the state supreme court may insist upon the
validity of state statutes or practices rather than take the extraordinary step of pronouncing them void.
192. The Court makes this point in Serrano. 454 U.S. 1, 4 (1981). While I find it marginally persuasive, I
tend to think it ought to be recalled when the Congress evaluates the Reagan Administration's proposal to
permit the federal courts to conduct a preliminary examination of "'unexhausted" habeas claims to decide
whether they should be denied summarily. To put it bluntly, it seems that the argument should work both ways.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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legitimate argument can be made that the exhaustion doctrine has been satis-
fied. The Serrano opinion contains no signal that flexibility of that kind will be
tolerated. Another recent per curiam, Anderson v. Harless,193 drives the point
home. In Harless the petitioner had made an effort to exhaust state remedies
regarding his claim that the trial judge's instructions to the jury had impermis-
sibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. While he had not explicitly
cited the due process clause in his brief in state court, he had apprised the
state courts of the facts critical to that federal claim and had argued that the
instructions were "erroneous" because they obligated the jury to infer
malice. 194 His principal authority was a previous state court decision in which
the defendant had raised both state and federal objections to similar instruc-
tions. The argument for compliance with the exhaustion doctrine was certain-
ly marginal, but after examining the state court opinion denying the petitioner
relief the federal district court below had decided that it was appropriate to
reach the merits and grant relief. The court of appeals also concluded that the
"due process ramifications" of the petitioner's claim had been clear enough
to the state courts and that, accordingly, they had been presented with the
"substance" of his federal claim.' 95 Still, the Supreme Court reversed, send-
ing the prisoner back to the state courts.
What next when the Supreme Court decides that a prisoner has failed to
exhaust state remedies, and, for that reason, vacates a judgment on the
merits? The federal district court on remand must dismiss for want of exhaus-
tion, but without prejudice to the renewed pursuit of the federal writ should
the state courts fail to award relief. '96 The prisoner must apply for relief to the
state courts by whatever means remain available, usually a motion or petition
in the nature of habeas corpus or coram nobis. '9 The state courts may or may
not be prepared to address the merits.'98 If they are, they know at the outset
193. 103 S. Ct. 276 (1982) (per curiam).
194. Id. at 277.
195. Id. at 278 (quoting Harless v. Anderson, 664 F.2d 610, 612 (6th Cir. 1982)). 1 may actually understate
the case for the prisoner's compliance with the exhaustion doctrine. Justice Stevens, for his part, found
the lower courts' treatment of the matter to reflect a "'sensible approach," and, lest the majority's description
mislead the reader, he set out the key portions of the circuit court's opinion in an extended note. Id. n.4
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
197. See generally L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 1-13 (1981). In Michigan, the state in
which Harless arose, no standard postconviction remedy of the kind established in most jurisdictions is pro-
vided. Motions for a new trial must generally be filed in the trial court within sixty days of the judgment. MICH.
CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 770.2 (West 1982). Nonetheless, the Court understood that relief might still be sought
from the Michigan Court of Appeals, apparently by a motion for delayed appeal. That, at any rate, was the
procedure followed in People v. Berry, 10 Mich. App. 469, 157 N.W.2d 310 (1968), the state precedent the Court
cited in Harless as an illustration. 103 S. Ct. 276, 278 (1982).
198. If they are, all is well. If relief is awarded, the prisoner has no further need to apply to the federal
courts; if relief is denied, a renewed habeas petition will be in order. E.g., Waters v. Wainwright, 527 F. Supp.
275, 276 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (noting that the prisoner's petition had originally been dismissed for want of exhaus-
tion but that a new application had been entertained after the state courts had denied relief). If the merits are not
addressed, the prisoner faces difficulties of a different order. If the state courts refuse to entertain tardy claims
because they might have been, but were not, raised in prior state proceedings, the respondent may now claim
the benefit of the Court's decisions regarding abortive state proceedings. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
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that it makes no practical difference what conclusion is reached. Even if they
decide that the claim is without merit, it is clear that the federal courts will
upset that judgment, effectively, when the prisoner returns to the federal
forum.'99 A doctrine that puts the state courts to meaningless litigation can
claim precious little basis in the notion of comity. Orderly state procedures
are not so much disrupted as abused, the state courts' participation in the
enforcement of federal law not so much frustrated as coerced.
The Court's response can be easily anticipated. If the doctrine exists it
must be enforced, and enforcement contemplates occasional reversals when
the lower courts have erroneously spoken to the merits. The rejoinder is
equally obvious. The notion that the exhaustion doctrine must be policed in
the manner of Harless rests on the unexamined premise that the federal
habeas courts cannot be trusted to exercise discretion in a proper manner.200
The premise is flawed. The appropriate timing of federal review is pre-
eminently a matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis by the courts
charged with responsibility for enforcing the Constitution on a daily basis.
The district courts' determinations in the first instance should almost always
be respected, subject to review for abuse at the circuit level. That is precisely
the view the Court took in Frisbie. The present Court's abandonment of the
flexibility of Frisbie for the relative rigidity of Harless bespeaks not an effort
(1977); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). It has happened time and again. Prisoners are sent back to state court
with instructions to pursue relief on a federal claim in the most unlikely manner, only to be saddled with a new
state court judgment that they have forfeited further state procedures for litigating that claim because of some
earlier procedural default. That judgment then becomes the basis for outright dismissal of a renewed application
for federal habeas review. E.g., Santana v. Fenton, 685 F.2d 71, 77 (3d Cir. 1982) (recognizing the procedural
default problem on the horizon); Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318, 320-21 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding state remedies
no longer available and remanding to the district court to determine whether the prisoner's procedural default
was excusable); Domaingue v. Butterworth, 642 F.2d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 1981) (affirming a dismissal for want of
exhaustion and leaving it to the district court to address the respondent's contention that habeas would be
barred should the prisoner be rebuffed by the state courts on a procedural default ground and thereafter return to
the federal forum); Thomas v. Wyrick, 622 F.2d 411, 414 (8th Cir. 1980) (anticipating the procedural default
difficulty should the state courts refuse to address a claim now dismissed for want of exhaustion).
The only outcome worse than losing a close exhaustion question, from the prisoner's standpoint, is winning
one. If, for example, a prisoner persuades the federal court that no state remedies remain available because the
relevant time periods have expired, the respondent will make the procedural default argument immediately and,
perhaps, win a prompt dismissal on that ground, with prejudice to further applications for relief. See, e.g.,
McLallen v. Wyrick, 494 F. Supp. 138, 143-44 (W.D. Mo. 1980). Indeed, that is precisely what happened in
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982) (concluding that the prisoners had satisfied the exhaustion doctrine
because their procedural defaults at trial had resulted in the forfeiture of further state remedies). Such is the lot
of unrepresented prison inmates, batted between two court systems in a vain search for the bare opportunity to
raise what may be a mertiorious claim that the United States Constitution has been violated.
199. Cf. Bergman v. Burton, 102 S. Ct. 2026, 2028 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (making the point in a
slightly different context), discussed infra note 251. The Fourth Circuit recognized the same point in Carver v.
Martin, 664 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1981), when it chose to reverse on the merits rather than remand with instructions
to dismiss a prisoner's petition for failure to exhaust state remedies. The district court may have misapplied the
exhaustion doctrine and reached the merits improperly, but if the judgment had been vacated only on the
exhaustion point the state courts would undoubtedly have been influenced by the knowledge that the district
court would rule the same way if presented with the same issue a second time. Of course, the same can be said in
any case in which an appellate court finds fault with a prisoner's exhaustion of state remedies after a district
court has awarded relief on the merits. That insight, however, only underscores the need fora reexamination of
the way in which the exhaustion doctrine is administered on appeal. See infra note 259.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
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merely to ensure that habeas adjudication is deferred in appropriate cases, but
an attempt to forge the exhaustion doctrine into an effective barrier to the
federal forum.
1. Rose v. Lundy
The preclusive consequences of the Court's current approach to exhaus-
tion is nowhere more evident than in the much-mooted decision in Rose v.
Lundy.20' Justice O'Connor's opinion for a larger than expected majority2
embraced what Justice Blackmun termed the "total exhaustion" rule.03
Simply stated, the district courts are instructed by Lundy to dismiss all claims
in a federal habeas petition if state remedies have not been exhausted regard-
ing any. 204 The rule contemplates the exhaustion of state remedies concerning
an entire case, including all claims a prisoner may have to assert against his or
her present detention, rather than the exhaustion of state remedies regarding
each individual claim.205 Necessarily, claims that have been properly pre-
201. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
202. Six members of the Court joined the portion of the opinion of primary interest here. Justice Blackmun
concurred only in the judgment, see infra note 214, Justice White filed a separate opinion expressing general
agreement with Justice Blackmun, see infra note 226, and Justice Stevens dissented, see infra note 214. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed an opinion concurring on the major issue but dissenting from Part
III-C, in which Justice O'Connor referred to the implications of Lundy for successive applications for habeas
relief. See infra notes 233-45 and accompanying text.
It is surprising that Justices Brennan and Marshall should step so easily into line, though, to be sure,
Brennan had signalled his views at oral argument. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. The counter-
arguments made by Justices Blackmun and Stevens are admittedly powerful. And it is difficult to understand
why two Justices who have defended postconviction habeas for so long should, without greater explanation,
agree to an opinion that promises to frustrate applications for relief. Perhaps Justice Brennan simply wished to
be in the majority on the primary issue to add weight to his dissent from Part IlI-C, which, by the way, deprived
Justice O'Connor of a majority in that section of her opinion. That would have been a switch in tactics from his
usual virulent dissents. Compare Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502-36 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (de-
livered well before Lundy), with Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 137-51 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (delivered
only a month after Lundy). Given the present alignment of the Justices regarding habeas issues, it may have
seemed to him that there was advantage to be gained by lowering his voice, even if only momentarily.
That possibility alone will not explain his position in Lundy. The votes were there for a majority opinion,
written by Justice Brennan or, perhaps, Justice White, that might have rejected Justice O'Connor's approach to
"mixed" petition cases in favor of, at the least, Justice White's alternative. I count Justices Blackmun and
White as solid, and the addition of Justices Brennan and Marshall would have made four. While Justice Stevens
might have refused to make a fifth for his own independent reasons, those same reasons might have caused him
to concur in Justice O'Connor's judgment in Lundy. In fact, he dissented. See infra note 214.
203. 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
204. 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982): "[W]e hold that a district court must dismiss such 'mixed petitions,' leaving
the prisoner with the choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the
habeas petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court."
205. See Oral Argument Transcript at 8:
Justice Stevens: Would you say that the Federal judge should dismiss the entire case, orjust say,
sorry, but there is one thing here that isn't exhausted, I will adjudicate the other?
Mr. Zimmerman: Yes, Your Honor, he should dismiss it and send it-
Justice Stevens: What, the whole thing?
Mr. Zimmerman: The prisoner-exactly. Remand the entire case back to the-
Justice White: Well, what good would it do to remand the claim that has already been exhausted?
Mr. Zimmerman: Well, you are remanding a case. You have to understand, Your Honor, that we
are submitting you are looking at a case on collateral review, and many claims, many constitutional
claims-
Justice White: I am not sure about that.
Once again I rely upon Mr. Zimmerman's memory for identification of the questioners.
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sented to the state courts and are thus "ripe" for federal review are to be
dismissed nonetheless if they are included in the same petition with other
claims regarding which state remedies have not been exhausted. No warrant
can be found for such a rule in section 2254, which states that the exhaustion
doctrine has yet to be satisfied if state procedures remain open for the litiga-
tion of the "question" presented.2° Justice O'Connor recognized as much in
Lundy, but found the statutory language "too ambiguous" to control the issue
at bar.2 °7 Finding no better guidance in the legislative history, she concluded
that in all probability Congress had not anticipated the "mixed" petition
problem and, accordingly, had provided no resolution of it. Consequently,
she turned to the policies underlying the statute to "determine its proper
scope," and, in short order, found herself tracing once again the development
of the exhaustion doctrine in the Court's own decisions prior to 1948. 2o8
Justice O'Connor based the Court's conclusion primarily upon one of the
two familiar rationales for the exhaustion doctrine generally-the mainte-
nance of state court participation in the elaboration of federal law. 2°9 A
"rigorously enforced" rule requiring total exhaustion, she said, will encour-
age state prisoners to seek "full" relief first from the state courts, providing
those courts with the initial opportunity to consider "all" federal claims.
2
'
0
Accordingly, the state courts "may become increasingly familiar with and
hospitable toward federal constitutional issues., 21 ' Next she proposed that
the total exhaustion rule will "reduce the temptation to consider unexhausted
claims., 21 2 Her opinion is oblique on the point, but it appears that she meant
to embrace a line of argument put forward in some circuit opinions, in which it
had been suggested that the immediate federal examination of "exhausted"
claims may often result in some consideration of "unexhausted" claims into
the bargain, no matter how carefully the district court seeks to ensure that
only claims that have been to state court are determined on the merits.2 3 The
206. See supra note 1; accord Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 355 (5th Cir. 1978) (conceding as much
but finding the point inconsequential).
207. 455 U.S. 509, 516 (1982).
208. Id. at 516-19. See supra notes 57-116 and accompanying text.
209. 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
210. 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982).
211. Id. at 519 (referring to Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973)).
212. 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982).
213. Judge Tjoflat's opinion for the court in Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978), worries
over the opportunity presented in such cases for manipulation by devious petitioners. He posits a prisoner who,
having both exhausted and unexhausted claims, proffers both in a single petition for the purpose of spiriting
evidence relating only to unexhausted claims into a hearing held to examine exhausted claims, hoping that the
court will look upon exhausted claims with greater sympathy if it appears that arguably meritorious unexhausted
claims are also available. Id. at 359. See also id. at 358 (suggesting that prisoners might attempt to avoid the
defense of laches by attaching unexhausted claims to a petition asserting exhausted claims to notify the
respondent that those claims exist). Happily, the Supreme Court's opinion in Lundy does not rest upon that kind
of speculation. Judge Goldberg's dissent, one should hope, has carried the day:
The majority also suggests that the rule of complete exhaustion will have the effect of denying a
petitioner the opportunity to pursue an unfair trial strategy(!). The Clarence Darrow Joneses who
apparently populate the state penitentiaries in the Fifth Circuit might otherwise include unexhausted
claims in their petitions in the calculated hope of influencing the district court's resolution of the
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inclusion of unexhausted claims in a petition apprises the district court of their
existence. Thereafter, and particularly if those claims appear to have merit,
the federal court's examination of exhausted claims properly at bar may be
influenced by the memory of unexhausted claims lurking in the background at
present but likely to be brought to the fore in subsequent petitions. Indeed,
that consideration may be conscious. If, for example, the treatment of cur-
rently exhausted claims warrants an evidentiary hearing, the court may per-
mit evidence to be adduced regarding unexhausted claims to derive maximum
benefit from the hearing and, perhaps, to avoid another one when and if the
prisoner returns to federal court.2 4 Justice O'Connor next asserted a utilitar-
ian argument. Federal claims that have been "fully exhausted," she said,
"will more often be accompanied by a complete factual record to aid the
federal courts in their review.' ' 21 5 Because the federal habeas courts often
exhausted claims.... I suppose it is possible to imagine a petitioner capable of formulating such a
strategy. I cannot, however, imagine that the district judges of this circuit would be taken in by such a
strategem [sic].
Although I hesitate to enter an argument which I am firmly convinced has more to do with the
court of the Red Queen than it does with the courts of this circuit, I must point out that even on the
majority's own premises, the threat of a laches dismissal is not likely to be perceived as a very serious
incentive to join all potential claims in the initial federal proceeding. A petitioner sophisticated enough
to worry about the laches problem, but determined to pursue a strategy of piecemeal litigation, will
certainly be clever enough to develop the simple strategem [sic] which permits him to pursue his plan
and avoid a laches defense: file two separate, but simultaneous, petitions, one in federal court contain-
ing only exhausted claims, the other, in either federal or state court, containing only unexhausted
claims. Filing of the petition containing unexhausted claims will foreclose a laches defense to the extent
that mere notice of the existence of such claims has this effect .... The rule of complete exhaustion is
a very blunt and largely ineffective instrument for dealing with the legal prestidigitations of a habeas
Houdini.
Id. at 370 nn.5-6 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
214. The point might have provided a narrower ground of decision in Lundy itself. The prisoner had
originally raised a total of four claims in federal habeas, two of which were conceded to be unexhausted.
Nevertheless, the district court had referred to those claims and nineteen other instances of alleged prosecu-
torial misconduct in the course of reaching a favorable decision. Lundy v. Thompson, No. 79-308 I-NA-CV, slip
op. at 1-2 (M.D. Tenn. March 21, 1979). The district court explained that it was necessary to refer to unex-
hausted claims and to review the full record to assess the "atmosphere" in which the prisoner's constitutional
claims had arisen. Id. at 2. In Justice O'Connor's estimate, the district court, accordingly, considered "several
instances of prosecutorial misconduct never challenged in the state trial or appellate courts, or even raised in the
[prisoner's] habeas petition." 455 U.S. 509, 513 (1982).
On appeal the circuit court understood the district court's judgment to rest solely upon the two exhausted,
and therefore cognizable, grounds. Lundy v. Rose, No. 79-1280 (6th Cir. June 27, 1980). Nevertheless, the
district court's work aroused legitimate suspicion that the award of habeas relief had been made, at least in part,
on the basis of unexhausted claims. It was upon this basis that Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment in
Lundy. While he could not embrace the majority's total exhaustion rule as the ground for decision, he agreed
that the case should be remanded "for reconsideration of the merits of [the prisoner's] constitutional argu-
ments." 455 U.S. 509, 531 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens, in contrast, insisted that "the procedure followed by the federal [district] court was
entirely correct." Id. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The court was, in his judgment, under an obligation to
consider the prisoner's exhausted claims against the "context" in which the alleged errors occurred to deter-
mine whether the errors were "aggravated" or "mitigated" by other aspects of the trial. Id. at 541-42 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The district court's error, then, was not in the procedure it followed in appraising exhausted
claims nor in resting relief in part upon unexhausted grounds, but in determining that the prisonerwas entitled to
habeas corpus relief. Because Stevens concluded that neither exhausted nor unexhausted claims had rendered
the prisoner's trial "fundamentally unfair," he would have denied relief on the merits. Id. at 545 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
215. 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982).
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may, and in some instances must, presume state factual findings to be correct,
the availability of a complete state court record will render federal review
more efficient.1 6 Finally, she proposed that the total exhaustion rule will
discourage "piecemeal" litigation. 7 The federal consideration of all claims in
a single proceeding will benefit both the federal courts, which conserve their
resources, and habeas applicants, whose claims may be treated to a "more
focused and thorough review.'
218
None of Justice O'Connor's arguments justifies the total exhaustion rule
established in Lundy. Only the first two enjoy firm footing in the Court's
precedents pertaining to the postponement of federal habeas review. Even
they fail to support the total exhaustion rule in whose defense they are prof-
fered. The other two contentions have no history in previous exhaustion
doctrine cases and, introduced for the first time in Lundy, carry no per-
suasiveness at all toward the matter in issue. It is not that they are irrational or
in any way illegitimate, but only that they are irrelevant in this context.
The preservation of the state courts' role in the adjudication of federal
claims provides powerful support for the exhaustion doctrine generally. That
same policy fails to justify the total exhaustion rule, the effect of which is to
delay the federal consideration of federal claims even though the state courts
have had a fair opportunity to address them and have concluded that no relief
is warranted. No court and few commentators have ever proposed that un-
exhausted claims should be reviewable in habeas, except in "special circum-
stances." 2 9 The ordinary exhaustion doctrine thus ensures that the state
courts will have their chance to treat federal issues before the federal habeas
courts exercise their independent jurisdiction.220 I fail to comprehend how the
postponement of federal review after the state courts have spoken furthers
any interest the state courts have in an initial opportunity to speak. By hy-
pothesis, that interest is respected by the exhaustion doctrine itself, unaided
by the rule announced in Lundy.22
216. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976) (quoted supra note 158).
217. 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982).
218. Id.
219. 1 mean here to take in not only the cases mentioned earlier, but modem interpretations of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)-(c) (1976), in which the Court has found state remedies to be unavailable or ineffective within the
meaning of the statute. E.g., Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam); cf. Marino v. Ragen, 332
U.S. 561, 569-70 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (complaining about the Illinois "'merry-go-round' of post-
conviction remedies). The lower court decisions in point usually deal with undue delay in state court proceed-
ings, e.g., Mucie v. Missouri State Dep't of Corrections, 543 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1976), rules of practice that cut
off further state proceedings because of a litigant's procedural default, e.g., United States ex rel. Barksdale v.
Sielaff, 585 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979), or recent state court precedents making it
clear that it would be futile to ask the state courts for relief on similar grounds, e.g., Adkins v. Bordenkircher,
674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 119 (1982).
220. This is, of course, the point that Justice Blackmun attached to the top of his separate opinion. 455 U.S.
509, 524 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring): "I do not dispute the importance of the exhaustion requirement or
the validity of the policies on which it is based. But I cannot agree that those concerns will be sacrificed by
permitting district courts to consider exhausted habeas claims.- Id.
221. See Comment, Criminal Procedure-Habeas Corpus-Petition Containing Both Exhausted and Un-
exhausted Clains Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies-Gonzales v. Stone, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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Straining, I can anticipate two ways in which the total exhaustion rule
might make a further contribution. First, one may argue that the rule will
encourage state prisoners to raise a greater number of federal claims in state
court and to do so as soon as possible to pave the way for federal review in
habeas. Included in that mass of claims will be some upon which relief may be
granted, in either forum, but also many that may be assumed to be without
merit, even frivolous. The state courts should be consulted, however, even
regarding these last. Even frivolous claims promise an opportunity to gain
experience in handling federal issues, and the state courts need the practice.
That is why federal habeas review of exhausted claims should await state
court litigation of others. I say this argument may be made, but I frankly
doubt that the Court intends to make it. The Justices can hardly say in one
breath that the state courts are fully capable of adjudicating federal claims and
in the next that they are so inexperienced that federal treatment of issues they
have already considered must be delayed while they sharpen their skills on
claims the federal courts are admittedly unwilling to examine immediately and
that may never command federal attention.222
Second, in many cases two or more claims are related; effective treat-
ment of any demands consideration of all. In some instances multiple claims
may arise from the same facts.223 And in many cases the merit of claims can be
evaluated only against the background of other events at trial2?2 4 In those
circumstances, one may argue that the state courts have not had a fair oppor-
tunity to adjudicate unless they have been presented with all related claims.
No single, exhausted claim can or should be isolated from the others for
separate treatment. The difficulty with this argument is that the Court ex-
plicitly rejected it in Lundy. Justice O'Connor acknowledged that several
circuits had staked out this middle ground, dismissing mixed petitions presen-
ting related claims rather than choosing between the total exhaustion rule
adopted in a minority of circuits and the ordinary rule, adopted in most, that
only unexhausted claims must be dismissed.2 s Indeed, she recognized that
1428 (1977) (criticizing the total exhaustion rule); Note, Habeas Petitions with Exhausted and Unexhausted
Claims: Speedy Release, Comity and Judicial Efficiency, 57 B.U.L. REV. 864 (1977) (making similar argu-
ments).
222. Said another way, at some point the Court must recognize that consistency is measured by analytic
coherency, not by a pattem of decisions in which the prisoner always loses on whatever arguments come to
hand. If, as the Court insisted in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976), the state courts are capable of
treating federal issues with imagination and sensitivity, then they presumably need no additional "'practice" and
Lundy must be justified on other grounds.
223. Compare Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (treating a claim that an exparte communication
with a jury had robbed the defendant of an impartial jury), with Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966)
(entertaining a claim that similar circumstances had deprived the defendant of the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses).
224. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974) (concerning remarks by the prosecutor);
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973) (conceming jury instructions).
225. She cited three cases for the "general rule among the Courts of Appeals" that "'mixed" petitions
containing "interrelated" claims should be dismissed in their entirety. 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). Two of her
examples, Triplett v. Wyrick, 549 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1977), and Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967 (lst Cir. 1976), are
directly on point. The third, Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969), did not address the issue
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the case at bar might be disposed of in precisely that way. 2 26 Yet she chose
instead to embrace the total exhaustion rule to "relieve the district courts of
the difficult if not impossible task of deciding when claims are related."
2 7
Indeed, the difficulty goes deeper. The Court's rejection of a more flexible
rule, by which the federal habeas courts would dismiss only mixed petitions
asserting related grounds, some of which remain unexhausted, amounts to
obvious overkill if, in truth, the evil to be prevented is premature treatment of
unexhausted issues. For it is only in cases in which exhausted and unexhaust-
ed claims are related that the district courts face that problem. If prisoners'
unexhausted claims are not tied in some way to issues that are ripe for deci-
sion, the habeas courts would have to reach out to determine them. 28
The last two arguments raised in Lundy in support of the total exhaustion
rule are of a different order entirely. They relate not to the justifications for
delaying federal adjudication in the interest of comity, but to matters of
efficiency. It is quite true that if the state courts develop complete records
and, perhaps, find the primary facts in a reliable manner, the federal courts'
subsequent task may be made easier. The efficiency of federal litigation is not,
however, a reason for postponing that litigation until after the state courts
have acted. Whatever benefit the federal courts may derive from previous
directly and warrants citation only because the court relied at least in part upon Second Circuit precedents in
reaching its decision. It is the Second Circuit that is most prominently associated with the view that the
relationship, if any, between exhausted and unexhausted claims ought to make a difference. E.g., United States
ex rel. Levy v. McMann, 394 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1968). Indeed, that circuit had drawn even finer lines than the
description in the text suggests. In United States ex rel. DeFlumer v. Mancusi, 380 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1967) (per
curiam), the court affirmed the dismissal of an entire mixed petition because if one unexhausted claim (that a
plea of guilty had been coerced) was decided against the prisoner, his single exhausted claim (that an earlier
confession had been coerced) would be rendered inconsequential. It was, at any rate, the position put forward in
the Second Circuit's cases that the warden in Lundy challenged in brief. Brief for Petitioner at 18 n. 12. See
generally United States ex rel. Martin v. McMann, 348 F.2d 896, 898 (2d Cir. 1965).
226. 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). The district court had apparently concluded that the prisoner's four claims
were related and for that reason had referred to all four in reaching a decision to award relief based upon the two
claims regarding which state remedies had been exhausted. See supra note 214. On a parity of reasoning, the
relationship between and among the claims might have warranted dismissal under the Second Circuit's inter-
mediate approach to the mixed petition problem. Justice White, for his part, stated explicitly that the district
court judge "should rule on ... exhausted claims unless they are intertwined with those he must dismiss or
unless the habeas petitioner prefers to have his entire petition dismissed." 455 U.S. 509, 538 (1982) (White, J.,
concurring & dissenting). While Justice White did not state explicitly that Lundy itself presented related claims,
he identified his separate opinion as in part a concurrence. It seems reasonable to conclude that he meant to
concur in the Court's judgment to remand the case, though on this independent basis. While Justice Blackmun
was not convinced that the four claims raised by the prisoner were related, see id. at 531 n.8 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring), he also seemed to embrace the view that exhausted and unexhausted claims can be dismissed
together if they are. That, in any event, is the most reasonable construction of his view that Lundy should have
been remanded with instructions to examine the prisoner's exhausted claims and to "determine whether they
[were] interrelated with the unexhausted grounds and, if not, whether they warrant[ed] collateral relief." Id.at
532 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
227. 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). But see id. at 526-27 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (insisting that the federal
habeas courts can distinguish "related" and "unrelated- claims).
228. Two student papers treating the total exhaustion rule, although published prior to Lundy, concluded
that the intermediate position adopted in the Second Circuit fully protects relevant state interests. See Com-
ment, Criminal Procedure-Habeas Corpus--Petition Containing Both Exhausted and Unexhausted Claims
Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies-Gonzales v. Stone, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1428 (1977); Note,
Habeas Petitions with Exhausted and Unexhausted Claims: Speedy Release, Comity and Judicial Efficiency, 57
B.U.L. REV. 864 (1977).
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state court adjudication is, at most, an agreeable by-product. Federal review
is not deferred to allow the state courts to assist the federal courts in the
exercise of their independent habeas jurisdiction, but rather to accord appro-
priate respect to state interests in orderly administration and to ensure state
courts a proper role in the creation and development of federal law. State
courts might take offense if the Justices should instruct the lower federal
courts to stay their hand regarding federal claims, because they stand to
benefit from preliminary state review-as though the state courts were stalk-
ing horses to be used by federal judges anxious to conserve their own efforts
in habeas cases.229
Coming to Justice O'Connor's argument that the total exhaustion rule
discourages piecemeal litigation, it is clear that she misses the point once
again. The state courts' function is not to assist in making federal habeas
adjudication efficient, even "focused" or "thorough." The federal courts
themselves shoulder that responsibility. "0 The state courts are free to estab-
lish rules designed to make their own work efficient and might, for that pur-
pose, insist that prisoners present all their claims in a single state proceed-
ing.23I They have no responsibility to entertain a range of issues for the pur-
pose of permitting the federal courts to treat those claims in a single federal
proceeding.232 Again, it is vital to keep in mind the nature of the exhaustion
doctrine and its function. We deal here with a rule that contemplates the
postponement of federal adjudication and, consequently, the continuation of
what may be unconstitutional detention to avoid interference with state pro-
cedures and to foster state court participation in the examination of federal
229. 1 am reminded of the recommendations put forward by the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent
Crime, formed by President Reagan to propose answers to serious national problems. The Task Force recom-
mended that the Attorney General support or propose legislation that would require the federal habeas courts to
give the state courts the opportunity to conduct any evidentiary hearings necessary to determine state prisoners'
federal claims. The Task Force explained that under its proposal habeas cases would "in effect" be "remitted"
to state court, where evidentiary hearings would be held "unless the state court was unable, due to court
congestion, or unwilling to conduct the hearing." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 59 (1981). The Task Force neglected to explain why state courts
should wish to replace federal magistrates, finding primary facts for federal district judges. See also 455 U.S.
509, 526 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (pointing out that the federal habeas courts already have ample means
of developing a complete factual record from which to work).
230. When the Ninth Circuit considered this argument prior to Lundy, it will be recalled, that court lumped
the avoidance of "piecemeal" litigation in habeas with the "judicial policy against fragmentary appeals."
Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing federal appellate review cases). Nothing is wrong, of
course, with federal court policies that encourage efficiency within the federal system. The relevance of those
policies to the exhaustion doctrine is, however, quite another matter.
231. See 455 U.S. 509, 525 n.2 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 373
(5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Of course, if a state were to rely upon a procedural defaultlforfeiture
rule as an enforcement device, the consequences for federal habeas corpus would be measured by reference to
Noia and Sykes. See supra notes 2 & 198.
232. See Comment, Criminal Procedure-Habeas Corpus-Petition Containing Both Exhausted and Un-
exhausted Claims Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies-Gonzales v. Stone, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1428, 1438 (1977) (insisting that if"judicial efficiency is a relevant consideration in habeas cases it is important to
[understand] it for what it is-an administrative value").
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issues. Innovations such as the total exhaustion rule must be justified accord-
ingly.
2. Exhaustion and Rule 9
The confusion of the exhaustion doctrine with policies designed to
streamline habeas litigation accounts, perhaps, for Justice O'Connor's appar-
ent attempt to link the total exhaustion rule with the scheme established by
section 2254 Rule 9. 233 An understanding of her effort, and why it must ulti-
mately fail, requires some background. Under rule 9(a) state prisoners must
not delay the presentation of their federal claims to the prejudice of the
respondent. If they do, the federal courts may refuse to treat them. At the
same time, under rule 9(b), prisoners may forfeit claims that might have been,
but were not, raised in prior federal proceedings. Prisoners are thus squeezed
from both directions. They are told that they must raise their federal claims
promptly or lose them under rule 9(a), and they are told that if they pursue
some claims while withholding others they may forfeit the latter under rule
9(b). The two halves of the rule are not in conflict. The lower courts have
properly construed the term "delay" in rule 9(a) to mean "unreasonable
delay"-delay that is not explained by the demands of adequate investigation,
preparation, or preliminary procedure. 34 Federal review will not be denied
unless that delay is ascribable to the prisoner and works to the proven pre-
judice of the respondent in answering the prisoner's allegations.3 5 Rule 9(b) is
wholly consistent. It seeks only to catch prisoners who consciously withhold
claims from an initial petition with the intention of raising those claims in a
subsequent application for relief. Prisoners who deliberately string out federal
treatment of their claims in piecemeal fashion for the purpose of harassing the
respondent may fairly be found to have abused the writ. To discourage abuse,
rule 9(b) imposes a forfeiture sanction, permitting, but not requiring, the
233. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9 (1976). That rule provides as follows:
(a) Delayed petitions.
A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the respondent is an officer has
been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows
that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable
diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.
(b) Successive petitions.
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or
different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different
grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior
petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1976) (establishing similar standards for treating successive applications).
234. See, e.g., Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913 (1981);
accord Moore v. Smith, 694 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1982); Brim v. Solem, 693 F.2d 44 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
235. E.g., Marks v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1982) (embracing the conventional view that
prisoners asserting right-to-counsel claims cannot be held responsible for delay occurring prior to Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)); Paprskar v. Estelle, 612 F.2d
1003, 1005-07 (5th Cir.) (providing a good discussion), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 885 (1980).
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federal habeas courts to dismiss claims that should have been raised in prior
proceedings.236 Taken together, the two rules encourage state prisoners to
raise all their claims together and to do so as soon as possible. 7
When in Lundy Justice O'Connor turned to the prisoner's protest that the
total exhaustion rule would delay the treatment of currently exhausted claims,
she offered that he might avoid delay by amending his petition to delete
currently unexhausted claims and then requesting speedy consideration of the
remaining exhausted claims. She warned, however, that if he were to do that
he would "risk" the forfeiture of currently unexhausted claims under rule
9(b). 238 Read charitably, that dictum suggests that the total exhaustion rule
can labor in tandem with rule 9 to produce what the latter was clearly intended
to encourage-the early federal adjudication of all claims in a single federal
proceeding. It won't work. The exhaustion doctrine, ever tied to the deferral
of federal review, is at cross-purposes with rule 9. Prisoners whose mixed
petitions are dismissed for want of total exhaustion may choose to abandon
federal court regarding all claims for the moment, pursue state remedies for
currently unexhausted claims, and later return to the federal forum with a new
petition presenting all claims. Apparently, Justice O'Connor would prefer that
route since it leads to the federal treatment of all claims in a single proceed-
ing. 39 Yet the federal adjudication of federal claims will hardly be expedited
236. See Jones v. Estelle, 692 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1982); Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 877 (1981). Judge Rosenn's application of these principles in Williams v. Holbrook, 691 F.2d 3, 11-15
(lst Cir. 1982), is exemplary.
237. Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348,357 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal
Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IOWA L. REV. 15
(1977) (describing the legislative background).
238. 455 U.S. 509, 520-21 (1982). 1 hasten to point out that Justice O'Connor did not suggest that the federal
habeas court entertaining a prisoner's initial application should deal with the consequences of withholding or
withdrawing unexhausted claims. The effect of either action will be for the court entertaining any future
application to determine. Niziolek v. Ashe, 694 F.2d 282, 285 (1st Cir. 1982); Powell v. Spalding, 679 F.2d 163.
165-66 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982); Yount v. Patton, 537 F. Supp. 873, 874-75 (W.D. Pa. 1982). The district court
decision in Earl v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Tex. 1980), holding otherwise, is simply wrong. While
counsel for the warden in Lundy cited Earl in brief, Brief for Petitioner at 24 n. 16, he acknowledged at oral
argument that the effect of the withdrawal of unexhausted claims would be controlled by rule 9(b). Oral
Argument Transcript at 12. Counsel for the prisoner did not deal with the issue in brief, but directed the Court's
attention to rule 9 during argument. Id. at 40. Of course, ifa prisoner withholds a claim in the first instance, the
district court may not be aware of its existence and thus can hardly be in a position to address the impact of the
prisoner's action upon future applications. Cf. Jones v. Wainwright, 608 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to
entertain a warden's complaint that the prisoner was withholding an unexhausted claim and rejecting the
argument that the court should require the prisoner to accept dismissal of his current petition or to "explicitly
waive" the unexhausted claim).
If the prisoner initially asserts an unexhausted claim but withdraws it to protect other claims from dismissal
under Lundy, the situation is a bit different. In that event the district court knows that the unexhausted claim
exists. Still, the result is the same. The effect of its withdrawal cannot be assessed at present, but must be left to
the future court that may be called upon to consider it. The necessary decision whether the prisoner has abused
the writ can only be made at that time, when the future habeas court can appraise the facts and determine
whether the withdrawal constituted a deliberate decision to abandon the unexhausted claim for the purpose of
stringing out the proceedings in piecemeal fashion. See Paprskar v. Estelle, 612 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 885 (1980).
239. 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982) (describing the majority's decision as an instruction to habeas petitioners to
take each of their claims to state court before bringing any to the federal forum in habeas).
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in any way if prisoners follow the preferred course. Currently exhausted
claims will be withheld pending the exhaustion of state remedies regarding
unexhausted claims. Alternatively, prisoners may simply amend their mixed
petitions to eliminate unexhausted claims and resubmit currently exhausted
claims for immediate attention. Justice O'Connor plainly wishes to discourage
that course, as evidenced by her reference to the risk of forfeiture under rule
9(b).24 ° Yet prisoners can hope to accelerate the federal adjudication of any
claims only by deleting those that are unexhausted.
Rule 9 expedites federal adjudication, while the exhaustion doctrine post-
pones it for certain identifiable reasons. Lower court interpretations of rule 9
have reached an accommodation with exhaustion, so that the policies favor-
ing early federal review are served without jeopardizing the competing
policies favoring delay until after the state courts have had an opportunity to
act. Justice O'Connor's attempt to shift the exhaustion doctrine to ground
occupied by rule 9 alone poses a serious threat to the current understanding of
that rule. The result can only be confusion and, in some instances, the frustra-
tion of federal review at any time. Coming first to rule 9(a), it is well settled
that the time necessary for compliance with the exhaustion doctrine cannot be
counted as "delay" within the meaning of the rule. 24t Federal review is not
foreclosed even if the respondent is prejudiced by the passage of time during
which the prisoner pursues relief in state court. If it were otherwise, prisoners
might be caught between two procedural rules, both of which could not be
satisfied. 242 Turning to rule 9(b), it is equally well settled that the withholding
240. 1 choose the term "forfeiture" carefully. Justice O'Connor, for her part, tried in Lundy to equate the
preclusion of unexhausted claims with a prisoner's deliberate decision to abandon those claims to pursue others.
She recognized that rule 9(b) "incorporates" the judge-made guidelines set forth in Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1 (1963), which, in turn, permit the federal habeas courts to identify an abuse of the writ only when
prisoners are found to have waived an opportunity for litigating the same claims in prior postconviction proceed-
ings. In an attending footnote she refered to Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924), in which the Court
refused to entertain a claim that might have been, but was not, litigated in prior habeas proceedings. Yet even as
she acknowledged that exhaustion doctrine cases are not "controlled" by Wong Doo for the obvious reason that
prisoners cannot litigate unexhausted claims and must hold them back until the state courts have examined
them, she proposed that Wong Doo "provides some guidance for the situation in which a prisoner deliberately
decides not to exhaust his claims in state court before filing a habeas corpus peititon." 455 U.S. 509, 521 n. 13
(1982). That will not do at all. Even if prisoners do withhold unexhausted claims intentionally (knowing that they
are not yet ripe for federal consideration and will be dismissed summarily if presented), their decisions are
hardly to be equated with those of others who intentionally withhold claims that can be presented immediately
for the purpose of harassing respondents with piecemeal litigation. On a more realistic plane, the most likely
explanation for prisoners' failure to raise any claims, exhausted or unexhausted, is that those claims are simply
overlooked out of negligence or ignorance. If, indeed, Justice O'Connor intended to box both unexhausted and
exhausted claims out of later federal proceedings, it can hardly be as a suitable penalty for vexatious manipula-
tion. There is a word to describe what she is talking about. It is not "waiver," but "forfeiture." See 455 U.S.
509, 528 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
241. See Louis v. Blackburn, 630 F.2d 1105, 1110 (5th Cir. 1980).
242. This argument prevailed in Congress when it was originally proposed that rule 9(a) should include an
explicit "presumption" of prejudice to the respondent in any case in which federal relief was sought more than
five years after the judgment under attack. Professor Clinton carried the day with the explanation that the
exhaustion of state remedies might alone require that much time. Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus
Rules: A Case Study on the Needfor Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IOWA L. REV. 15,26-29 (1977); see
also Coleman v. Balkeom, 451 U.S. 949, 951 n.5 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (remark-
ing on the delay occasioned by compliance with the exhaustion doctrine). I have made an analogous argument
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of a claim for want of exhaustion does not constitute an "abuse" of the
writ.243 While the act of withholding or withdrawing an unexhausted claim
may well be "deliberate," no serious suggestion can be made that the
prisoner, although free to include all federal claims, fails to do so in order, in
Justice Brennan's terms, to "get more than 'one bite at the apple.' "44 Claims
that have not been put to the state courts must be omitted. Since the prisoner
has no choice in the matter, it would be unrealistic and patently unfair to
impose a penalty for a supposed "abuse.- 245
3. Exhaustion and Efficiency
The total exhaustion rule condemns itself. It furthers no values tradi-
tionally associated with exhaustion and promises no assistance within the
framework described by rule 9. Even if those shortcomings are overlooked
and the rule is defended as an aid to the efficiency of federal adjudication in
habeas, it must be found wanting. Its likely effect in concrete cases will be to
complicate, rather than simplify, the processing of habeas cases. To begin,
against bills in the Congress that would establish a statute of limitations for habeas applications, with the time
period running from the date of the conviction judgment. Prisoners cannot control the pace of state court
litigation, and it would be fundamentally unfair to foreclose federal review after a fixed period of time when the
delay results from compliance with the exhaustion doctrine. Habeas Corpus Procedures Amendments Act of
1981: Hearings on S. 653 Before the Subcomm. on Courts oftthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist
Sess. 179-80 (1982). The Reagan Administration's program attempts to meet that complaint by measuring its
proposed limitation period from the date when state remedies have been exhausted. The Administration's
Proposed Reforms in Habeas Corpus Procedures (March 4, 1982), reprinted in Habeas Corpus Reform Act of
1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before tire Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982); see S. 217, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 402 (1983) (incorporating the Administration's proposals). I have responded
elsewhere. Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IOWA L. REV. 609,612-14 n.22
(1983).
243. Brown v. Wyrick, 496 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mo. 1980); accordGaltieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 343,371
(5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); see Waters v. Wainwright, 527 F. Supp. 275, 276 (M.D. Fla. 1981)
(noting that the prisoner's claim had originally been dismissed for want of exhaustion but accepting a second
petition raising the same issue); United States ex rel. Gardner v. Meyer, 519 F. Supp. 75, 82 n.4 (N.D. II. 1981)
(dismissing one unexhausted claim but stating that the prisoner could raise it in a later petition after the state
courts had denied relief); cf. Simpson v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 494,495 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (reaching the
same result under the Sanders guidelines); Tannehill v. Fitzharris, 451 F.2d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1971) (same).
244. 455 U.S. 509,536 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). The essential point is, of
course, that both rule 9(b) and Sanders have as their objective the identification of petitioners who neglect some
claims for the purpose of harassing the respondent. Prisoners who withhold or withdraw claims because they
must hardly fall into that category. See Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727, 742-47 (5th Cir.) (recalling that the "abuse of
the writ" standard is equitable in nature and thus refusing to find a "waiver" simply because the prisoner had
deliberately withdrawn a previous habeas petition), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981); cf. McShane v. Estelle,
683 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1982) (illustrating that a federal evidentiary hearing may be necessary to determine
whether dismissal under rule 9(b) is warranted).
245. To date the lower courts have not been enthusiastic about the prospect. E.g., Powell v. Spalding, 679
F.2d 163, 165-66 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) (taking note of the dictum in Lundy but stating that in the case at bar the
prisoner could raise a withdrawn issue without abusing the writ); see Niziolek v. Ashe, 694 F.2d 282,285 n.2 (1st
Cir. 1982) (noting the question but failing to decide it); Taylor v. Scully, 535 F. Supp. 272, 276 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (commenting that it is "very unclear" what will happen if prisoners accept the "risk" noted in Lundy); cf.
Jones v. Hess, 681 F.2d 688, 695-96 (10th Cir. 1982) (issuing a warning that the "risk" exists). That is hardly
surprising. Not only is Justice O'Connor's treatment of the rule 9 point dissatisfying, but it carried only four
votes. See 455 U.S. 509, 538 (1982) (Brennan & Marshall, J.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (counting
Justices White and Blackmun with them). While Justice Stevens did not reach the rule 9 question, the tenor of
his opinion suggests that if he had, he would have joined the dissenters. See Martin v. White, 538 F. Supp. 326
327-28 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (anticipating that Justice Stevens will not join Justice O'Connor on this issue).
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prisoners will not understand it. Invariably proceeding without counsel, they
are unlikely to be aware of, let alone to comprehend, the Court's "simple and
clear" instructions: "[B]efore you bring any claims to federal court, be sure
that you first have taken each one to state court. 246 They will rely upon the
statute, which does not reflect the total exhaustion rule, and the standard
form, which insists that all grounds for relief be included.247 When in their
ignorance they file mixed petitions and suffer summary dismissal, they will
not understand why. Sympathetic judges may offer an explanation, but Lundy
does not seem to require one. 248 A brief explanation might be misleading in
any event. Prisoners need to know, but may not be told, that they are free to
return to federal court after exhausting state remedies regarding all their
claims or to "redraft their [present] pleadings with black magic markers." 249
Then again, if in the interest of fairness the district courts take the time to
guide prisoners through the justifications for, and the consequences of, dis-
missal under Lundy, the benefits of summary dismissal may be lost.
If prisoners are made to understand their options, and they return to state
court with currently unexhausted claims, even more state and federal judicial
resources may be squandered. The state courts may be put through needless
litigation regarding claims that never command a federal hearing. If prisoners
choose to pursue currently exhausted and unexhausted claims simultaneous-
ly, state court proceedings may be rendered moot by the award of habeas
relief while unexhausted claims are pending and, perhaps, after considerable
time and effort has been expended upon them. 2 0 The scenario may be no
better if prisoners choose to withhold currently exhausted claims until all
claims are ready for federal review. At that late date, the state courts will have
fully adjudicated currently unexhausted claims only to find that relief is forth-
coming based upon currently exhausted claims. 25' The federal courts, for their
246. 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Model Form for use in applications for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
At oral argument in Lundy, counsel for the prisoner contended that the form might trap unwary prisoners, often
proceeding pro se, into filing mixed petitions. Oral Argument Transcript at 38-40; see also 455 U.S. 509, 522
(1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (insisting that the total exhaustion rule can be read into the statute "'only by
sheer force" and that it "operates as a trap for the uneducated and indigent pro se prisoner-applicant").
248. Justice Blackmun raised the question in his separate opinion, but Justice O'Connor failed to treat it.
See 455 U.S. 509, 530 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (insisting that a prisoner's opportunity to amend his or
her way around Lundy "may depend on his awareness of the existence of that alternative or on a sympathetic
district judge who informs him of the option and permits the amendment"); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (fixing
limits on a party's ability to amend without leave of court).
249. 455 U.S. 509, 546 n.15 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. See 455 U.S. 509, 525 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that the total exhaustion rule will
waste valuable state court resources on "meritless" claims that "doubtless will receive little or no attention in
the subsequent federal proceeding that focuses on the substantial exhausted claim").
251. In Bergman v. Burton, 102 S. Ct. 2026 (1982), Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, dissented from the majority's decision to vacate the circuit court's judgment and to remand for
reconsideration in light of Lundy, decided two months earlier. Justice Stevens pointed out that the circuit court
had already held that the prisoner was entitled to relief on the basis of an exhausted claim that an invalid jury
instruction had been given at trial in state court. By focusing upon another claim, one that was unexhausted, and
insisting (apparently) that the entire petition be dismissed because of its inclusion with thejury instruction claim,
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part, are forced through two examinations of the same claims. 252 They must
consider each claim included in an initial petition to determine whether any
one has yet to be presented to the state courts. If an unexhausted claim is
discovered and the entire petition is dismissed, the same claims must be
reviewed again if the prisoner files a new petition, immediately or years later,
after state remedies have been exhausted regarding all issues. s If the lapse of
time between the two examinations is significant, the record will be cold,
frustrating not only the fair treatment of claims in federal habeas but the
prosecution's chances of winning a new conviction should habeas relief be
awarded and a new trial conducted. 254
The practical consequences of the total exhaustion rule are exacerbated
by its disquieting rigidity. The Court's opinion in Lundy admits of no flexibil-
ity at all, thus embracing an approach to mixed petitions harsher than any
previously envisioned. 2s5 Apparently, no distinctions are to be drawn. It
matters not that exhausted claims may be clearly meritorious while unex-
hausted claims are just as clearly frivolous. 5 6 It matters not that exhausted
the Supreme Court provided, in Stevens' mind, only another illustration that Lundy "merely complicates and
delays the termination of habeas corpus litigation," disserving "busy federal judges" and "deserving litigants"
alike:
Under Rose v. Lundy-if I read the Court's opinion correctly-after the case gets back to the
District Court, that court must dismiss the habeas corpus petition that is now a part of the record.
Thereafter, the respondent immediately will be entitled to resubmit a petition eliminating the unex-
hausted claim and confining his claim to relief to the issue that has already been resolved in his favor by
the Court of Appeals. It seems reasonable to assume that the District Court will grant the relief
mandated by the Court of Appeals that the District Court order will then be promptly appealed by the
warden, and that the Court of Appeals thereafter will decide ... the ... questions precisely as it
decided them in the opinion that this Court today is vacating. It seems equally likely that the warden
will remain dissatisfied with that ruling and then once again file a petition for certiorari, at which time
the Court can then determine whether to review the questions that are now presented.
Id. at 2028 (footnotes omitted).
252. 455 U.S. 509, 527-28 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 528.
255. Justice Blackmun noted that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which had adopted a total exhaustion rule
prior to Lundy, had not taken the "extreme" position that Justice O'Connor's opinion described. Id. at 529 n.7
(recalling that the Ninth Circuit permitted the district courts to consider prisoners' explanations for failing to
exhaust state remedies regarding all claims and allowed them to entertain mixed petitions if the state courts
delayed treatment of federal claims and that the Fifth Circuit had embraced an "appellate exception" to its
version of the total exhaustion rule). See infra note 259; see Little Light v. Crist, 649 F.2d 682,684-85 (9th Cir.
1981) (relaxing the Ninth Circuit's rule in the interest of fairness); Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir.
1976) (describing that circuit's general position); see also D.D.v. White, 650 F.2d 749, 750 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981)
(indicating that the Fifth Circuit admitted of exceptions to its rule for cases in which state remedies were
"absent" or "futile" or "inefficient"); Henson v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 250, 252 n. 1 (5th Cir.) (refusing to apply the
total exhaustion rule because the prisoner's unexhausted claim was frivolous), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1056
(1981). But see Genter v. Wainwright, 678 F.2d 934 (11 th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (understanding Lundy to adopt
the previously established Fifth Circuit rule).
256. Justice Stevens understood the Court to mean that any unexhausted claims, "no matter how frivo-
lous," will require the district court to postpone habeas review of exhausted claims, "no matter how obvious
and outrageous the constitutional violation may be." 455 U.S. 508, 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If anything,
Judge Goldberg was more eloquent in his dissent from the Fifth Circuit's adoption of a similar total exhaustion
rule. Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 367 (5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting): "For the unwitting,
naive, or optimistic inclusion of a single unexhausted claim in a prisoner's petition, the majority would deny a
federal hearing on a thousand exhausted claims. This is a new species of poisonous tree whose bitter fruit, I am
convinced, is the frustration of justice."
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and unexhausted claims are entirely unrelated, so that they may fairly be
treated separately.257 Indeed, it matters not that the case for compliance with
the exhaustion doctrine regarding all claims is close, so that different federal
judges might differ on the question whether a petition is mixed at all.25' In
every case the district courts "must" dismiss the entire petition. 2 9
After Lundy the exhaustion doctrine threatens to become precisely what
the Court has always disclaimed-a "blunderbuss" used to "shatter the
attempt at litigation of constitutional claims without regard to the purposes
that underlie the doctrine and that called it into existence. ' ' 260 We can antici-
257. As explained earlier, the total exhaustion rule is unnecessary if mixed petitions must be dismissed only
if they contain "related" claims. See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text; see also 455 U.S. 509, 526
(1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
258. Justice Stevens, for his part, worried that the total exhaustion rule will be invoked to short-circuit
habeas petitions in every case in which an appellate court disagrees with a district court's decision regarding an
exhaustion issue. Since many pro se applications are ambiguous at best, he warned that "such differing
appraisals should not be uncommon." 455 U.S. 509, 546 n.15 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259. The square holding in Lundy was arguably limited to a requirement that the district courts dismiss
mixed petitions. 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). 1 judge it too early to conclude that appellate courts, indeed the
Supreme Court itself, are equally obliged to dismiss for want of total exhaustion after a district court has reached
the merits. In cases of that kind, an appellate court's refusal also to treat the merits places the parties and the
state courts in the awkward position of undertaking what may be superfluous or repetitive litigation-aggravat-
ing, rather than reducing, intejurisdictional conflict. If the district court awarded relief on the basis of currently
exhausted claims, the litigation of currently unexhausted claims would then seem futile. Whatever the state
courts decide regarding those claims, it can be expected that, when given the opportunity once Lundy has been
satisfied, the district court will reaffirm its previous judgment regarding exhausted claims. Cf. Bergman v.
Burton, 102 S. Ct. 2026, 2028 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that in many cases prisoners who
have won a favorable judgment in the district court on some exhausted claims will simply delete unexhausted
claims from their petitions if an appellate court remands under Lundy). If the district court denied relief
regarding currently exhausted claims, renewed state court litigation may prove repetitive. In cases of that kind,
the prisoner is free to raise both unexhausted claims (not yet treated on the merits in the federal forum) and
exhausted claims (rejected on the merits by the district court but revived by the appellate court's order vacating
that judgment for want of total exhaustion). The state courts might yet award relief on any grounds, and, on
reexamining claims once rejected, the district court might take a position at odds with its decision when those
claims were before it earlier.
Because of the substantial threat that dismissals for want of total exhaustion would create friction between
the two systems, the Fifth Circuit has recognized an "appellate exception." Under that circuit's cases, decided
prior to Lundy, the appellate panel can review the merits notwithstanding the total exhaustion rule if the district
court erroneously failed to dismiss a mixed petition and, instead, reached the merits of some claims. Galtieri v.
Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 360-62 (5th Cir. 1978). Whether the Supreme Court means to be equally flexible is
problematic. If Justice O'Connor had wanted to adopt the Fifth Circuit's approach, she might have said as much
in Lundy, announcing the total exhaustion rule for the district courts but refusing to order dismissal at the
appellate level. Since Justice Blackmun raised the issue explicitly, it is difficult to propose that all the Justices
were not aware of it. 455 U.S. 509, 529 n.7 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Indeed, it appears that Justice
Stevens assumes that no "appellate exception" will be recognized. Id. at 546 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating his understanding that the total exhaustion rule will be invoked and the entire petition dismissed "every
time an appellate court disagrees with a district court's judgment that a petition contains only exhausted
claims"). I have to count the Court's disposition of several cases in the wake of Lundy to point in that direction.
See Duckworth v. Cowell, 455 U.S. 996 (1982) (remanding with explicit instructions to dismiss a mixed petition);
Rodriguez v. Harris, 455 U.S. 997 (1982) (same). Still, the arguments for an "appellate exception" being
powerful, I hesitate to rule out the possibility that the Court will embrace the idea until, of course, the Justices
speak to the issue. But see Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1982) (apparently invoking Lundy on
appeal when the district court had denied relief on the basis of exhausted claims below). The Fifth Circuit cases
to date are, I think, intentionally vague on the point. E.g., Bums v. Estelle, 695 F.2d 847, 853 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating that little may remain of the "appellate exception"); Barksdale v. Blackburn, 670 F.2d 22, 24 n. I (5th
Cir. 1982) (referring to the "appellate exception" in a case decided after Lundy).
260. 455 U.S. 509,523 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410
U.S. 484, 490 (1973)). In this same vein, I cannot resist one last quotation from Judge Goldberg. His words are as
applicable to the Supreme Court's decision in Lundy as they were in the context in which he wrote them:
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pate that, frustrated at the federal court house door by a rule that rejects some
claims because of procedural shortcomings regarding others, many prisoners
will abandon the habeas enterprise entirely. I will not accuse the Justices of
intending that result, or of gaining satisfaction in the knowledge that they have
established such onerous procedural burdens that prisoners are discouraged
from requesting federal postconviction relief.26' It is enough to point out that
the total exhaustion rule promises no less. Here again, whether by design or
not, the Court's approach to the exhaustion doctrine tends to transform it
from a discretionary rule of timing into a mechanism for the preclusion of
federal review.
4. The Impact Below
The Supreme Court's attitude regarding exhaustion, evidenced in
Serrano, Harless, and Lundy, has an inevitable effect upon the daily work of
the lower courts sitting in habeas. Some circuits increasingly hold state
prisoners to exacting standards, insisting that they explore any possible
means of raising their federal claims in state court and that, when the oppor-
tunity is presented, they identify those claims with precision. 262 Even when no
state remedies appear to be available, the slightest doubt is resolved in favor
of dismissal on the stated ground that the state courts should decide for
Mesmerized by a specter of its own creation, a litigious prisoner so diabolically clever that he may be
counted on to outwit state's attorneys and federal district judges, the court today condemns real men of
flesh and blood, untutored and unlettered in law, to years of unconstitutional confinement. Perhaps we
as judges cannot be expected to understand the full meaning of imprisonment and to respond to the full
measure of injustice visited upon one whose unlawful incarceration is prolonged for a year or more. We
can, however, be expected to understand and respond to the historic office of the Great Writ, provision
of "a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement."
Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348,367 (5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (also quoting Braden v. 30th
Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973)).
261. 1 do not lay such a charge, but Justice Blackmun comes ever so close. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 528 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (referring to the possibility that prisoners might forfeit any unex-
hausted claims they withdraw from mixed petitions and the additional possibility that society might be "forced
to sacrifice either the swiftness of habeas or its availability to remedy all unconstitutional imprisonments")
(emphasis added).
262. The Supreme Court said in Picard that habeas applicants need not cite "book and verse on the federal
constitution." Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971) (quoting Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th
Cir. 1958)). Nevertheless, some panels of the Second Circuit have insisted that a prisoner's briefs in state court
"must have contained words such as 'under the due process clause' or 'under the Constitution,' that expressly
spell out the petitioner's reliance on the United States Constitution." Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 282 (2d Cir.
1981). The key precedent in that circuit has been Johnson v. Metz, 609 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1979), in which a panel
held that a prisoner's state court claim that he had been denied "a fair trial" was insufficient to charge a due
process violation. More recently the en banc court has announced more flexible standards. Daye v. Attorney
General, 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982). In the future, state prisoners can satisfy the exhaustion doctrine without
referring to a specific federal claim by relying on federal precedents employing a constitutional analysis, by
relying on state court precedents employing a constitutional analysis in similar circumstances, by asserting a
claim in language that calls to mind a specific right protected by federal law, or by alleging a pattern of facts that
is "well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation." Id. at 194. The extent of the change is not yet clear.
The Daye court found it unnecessary to overrule Johnson. Still, it appears that the Second Circuit may be
coming around to an approach to the exhaustion doctrine that is more in keeping with its supporting rationales.
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themselves whether some state procedure remains open. 263 And, at all events,
the slightest shift in theories 264 or factual allegations 265 between the state and
federal forums leads to dismissal for inadequate compliance with the exhaus-
tion doctrine.26 6 In the wake of Lundy, prisoners' difficulties will be multi-
263. Stahl v. New York, 520 F. Supp. 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (insisting that it is for the state courts to
determine whether their postconviction remedies are open); Sabino v. LeFevre, 490 F. Supp. 183, 188 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (collecting the Second Circuit authorities to that effect); accord Santana v. Fenton, 685 F.2d 71
(3d Cir. 1982); White v. Wyrick, 651 F.2d 597 (8th Cir. 1981); cf. McPherson v. Barksdale, 640 F.2d 780 (6th Cir.
1981). But see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982) (examining the possibilities for litigation under Ohio
law and concluding that no remedies were reasonably available).
264. E~g., Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 997, 1002 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing to consider whether a
state sentencing scheme was so irrational that it violated the due process clause because the prisoner had argued
in state court only that it ran afoul of the eighth amendment); Sneed v. Blackburn, 569 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam) (concluding that the prisoner's claim in state court that the sheriff had consorted with jurors was
not sufficient to raise a federal claim that the right to jury trial had been violated).
265. E.g., Isaac v. Perrin, 659 F.2d 279, 281 n.l (1st Cir. 1981) (refusing to considerallegations of fact going
to the prisoner's speedy trial claim when they had not been presented to the state courts); Camillo v. Wyrick,
640 F.2d 931, 934-35 (8th Cir. 1981) (refusing to entertain allegations that a prisoner's plea of guilty had been
influenced by drugs and hospitalization when he had alleged in state court that the plea had been coerced from
him in jail).
266. Stringent pleading requirements regarding some common federal claims promise to leave the most
assiduous litigant exasperated. When, for example, the claim is that defense counsel delivered ineffective
assistance through a lengthy trial, or that a range of trial errors amounted in cumulative effect to a violation of
due process, it is extremely unlikely that the petitioner will be able to present the state courts with precisely the
same factual allegations and legal arguments the federal habeas court will be asked to entertain. To propose
otherwise is to assume unrealistically that would-be habeas applicants, or their lawyers, have a later habeas
petition in mind as they progress through the state courts with their federal claims. It also assumes that potential
petitioners and their attorneys are able to marshal all possible allegations and identify their legal significance
from the outset in state court. It would be nice (and efficient) if that were the case. It isn't. The run of the mine
case to which the exhaustion doctrine must speak is one in which an undereducated prison inmate (actingpro se)
is able (against the odds) to fashion a federal habeas petition that identifies (perhaps roughly) a cognizable claim
and supports it (more roughly) with ambiguous assertions of fact. I concede the federal court's dilemma. If the
claim is to be reached at all in the present atmosphere, it may seem necessary to treat only the particular
allegations regarding it that were presented squarely to the state courts. E.g., Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d
374, 379 (9th Cir. 1981) (limiting consideration to the specific point raised in state court-counsel's failure to
object to particular evidence); Cox v. Wyrick, 642 F.2d 222, 226 (8th Cir.) (declining to consider allegations
about counsel's work that were not raised in state court and limiting review to the prisoner's two specific
allegations of counsel error), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981); see Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294,
1294-95 (9th Cir. 1982) (Ely, J., concurring) (offering a brief discussion). The likely result when that course is
followed is plain enough-the denial of relief based on an incomplete record. E.g., Hall v. Sumner, 512 F. Supp.
1014 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 682 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1982).
Sympathetic judges who suspect that a prisoner's claim might be stronger than it appears from the pro se
petition may assign counsel to investigate and, perhaps, to propose appropriate amendments. E.g., Graham v.
Mabry, 645 F.2d 603,605 n. (8th Cir. 1981) (noting that several allegations had been introduced for the first time
in an amended petition filed by counsel). Yet that is troublesome on the same ground. It seems that those
allegations cannot be considered. E.g., Campbell v. Leeke, 533 F. Supp 1314 (D.S.C. 1982); Evans v. LeFevre,
490 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). If counsel gives up and decides to return to state court with new allegations
before putting them to the federal habeas court in an amended complaint, problems of a different order may be
presented. The state courts may be unwilling to consider those allegations because, to take the most common
example, they were not raised in prior state proceedings when the prisoner was attempting to exhaust state
remedies in the first instance. The state courts' refusal to consider the new allegations will, of course, satisfy the
federal habeas court that state remedies have now been exhausted. Nevertheless, those allegations may be
entirely foreclosed, in federal habeas as well as the state courts, because of the prisoner's unremediable
procedural default in initial state court proceedings. Cf. Domaingue v. Butterworth, 641 F.2d 8, 12-13 (Ist Cir.
198 1) (refusing to permit counsel to expand the petitioner's challenge to trial counsel's effectiveness by adding
new allegations in a supplemental application for further appellate relief in state court). See supra note 198 for a
discussion of these problems. In sum, prisoners whose federal claims rest upon multiple factual allegations and
subtle legal arguments are frustrated coming and going. The system in which they find themselves pictures an
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plied. They will face dismissal if they fail to meet rigorous standards regarding
any claims in their petitions, even, perhaps, claims of which they themselves
are unaware but which are discoverable by imaginative federal judges search-
ing for some basis upon which to rest a dismissal order. 67 In complex cases it
will be extremely difficult to isolate particular federal claims and their sup-
porting factual allegations, to identify them clearly to the state courts by any
possible means, to construct a federal habeas corpus petition that includes
those claims and allegations to the exclusion of all others, and thus to avoid
Lundy and obtain federal examination of the merits.2 6
V. SOME SUGGESTIONS IN CONCLUSION
I do not propose an abandonment of the "general rule" calling for ex-
haustion in the run of cases. There are perfectly good reasons for preferring
initial state court litigation of federal claims arising in state criminal prosecu-
entirely unrealistic state of affairs, in which professionally represented litigants marshal their allegations and
arguments with sophistication along a clear path to federal habeas. That is not, however, a realistic portrayal of
the process.
The answer, to my mind, lies in renewed flexibility. While I would not propose that prisoners be permitted
to present entirely different sets of operative facts in state and federal court and still claim that the same claim
has been raised in both, these cases by their nature call for a realistic appraisal of the situation from all
perspectives. Said another way, nothing is gained by demanding what cannot be supplied. If a prisoner,
particularly one proceeding pro se, manages to present roughly the same judicial business in both forums, that
ought to be enough. To parse habeas petitions and identify minor discrepancies with a prisoner's allegations in
state court is to overestimate the ability of the participants in litigation to state and restate legal contentions with
exaggerated precision. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that while Justice O'Connor complained in
Lundy that the district court had considered several allegations of prosecutorial misconduct that had not been
set before the state courts explicitly, she reserved her primary criticism for that court's apparent consideration
of two analytically distinguishable unexhausted claims. 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). See Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d
1163, 1167 n.3 (6th Cir. 1982) (reading Lundy in a similar manner). One may hope, then, that the Justices
recognize that the fair and proper orchestration of federal habeas review demands a certain realism about the
capacities of litigants.
The Eleventh Circuit's treatment in Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373 (1lth Cir. 1982), provides a good
illustration. The prisoner in that case had clearly raised a claim of conviction on insufficient evidence in both
state and federal court. The warden insisted, however, that he had also included in his federal petition the
related and unexhausted claim that his conviction rested upon an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. Id.
at 1376. The circuit court focused attention upon the precise language used in the federal habeas petition and
concluded that only the exhausted claim had been stated. On that basis Lundy was distinguished. Id. at 1376-79.
At the same time, the court signaled in parting that if it had found that both claims had been raised, it would have
gone on to decide whether, upon reflection, they were sufficiently distinct to invoke Lundy in any event. Id. at
1379 n. 11. The message was clear. Pressed to the boiling point, the court was prepared to declare the two claims
to be essentially the same, avoiding dismissal under Lundy on a yet more fundamental basis.
267. The real threat may come from wardens, whose attorneys may find it to their immediate advantage in
litigation to divert the case back to the state courts on any available basis. By combing an ambiguous pro se
petition and identifying some unexhausted claim buried in it, counsel may avoid, at least for a time, coming to
grips with the exhausted claims the prisoner meant to raise. In the long run, short-sighted tactics of this kind
make no sense for anyone concerned, but litigating attorneys who measure success in the "win-loss" columns
may have other things on their minds. I should hope that the federal habeas courts will be alert to the misuse of
Lundy. E.g., Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting a respondent's argument that
the prisoner's due process claim sounded in the sixth amendment and that the prisoner had failed to raise that
claim explicitly in state court).
268. If, for example, a prisoner's inclusion of a single unexhausted allegation of counsel error at trial will
mean that an entire petition, raising a dozen similar exhausted allegations, must be dismissed out of hand, the
federal courts' ability to enforce the Constitution will be severely diminished. If, as might well happen, the
dozen exhausted allegations make out a meritorious claim that counsel's representation was ineffective, wholly
apart from the single unexhausted point, it strains the temper to propose that further resort to the state courts
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tions, and I am. content that the exercise of federal jurisdiction should
ordinarily be postponed until the state courts have had a fair opportunity to
act.269 What I do propose, however, is that the federal courts acknowledge
their undoubted power to entertain federal claims at any time and that the
deferral of judgment pending the exhaustion of state remedies is only discre-
tionary in the circumstances of the particular case. If I had been before the bar
during oral argument in Lundy, I would have answered Justice Brennan forth-
rightly.2z 0 No, Picard did not decide that exhaustion is a requirement, if by
that he means ajurisdictional predicate. Nor did Pitchess intend effectively to
overrule Royall by referring to exhaustion as a prerequisite or precondition
for federal habeas review. 271 At most those cases indicate that the appellate
courts, indeed the Supreme Court itself, will occasionally second-guess dis-
trict court applications of the exhaustion doctrine.272 I also have my reserva-
tions about that, but the reviewability of exhaustion questions hardly makes
them jurisdictional.2 73 The Court's dicta in other cases, among them Mata,
Webb, and McNary, serve only to obscure the truth even more.274 If we are to
arrive at a workable exhaustion doctrine, the first step is clear thinking and
clear writing about the nature of the doctrine. It is a rule of timing, nothing
more.
I also propose that the federal courts cease efforts to resolve exhaustion
questions by reference to fixed rules rather than sound judgment groomed to
the circumstances of the case at bar. As Chief Justice Warren once reminded
his colleagues, it is state remedies that are to be exhausted, not state
prisoners.27 Rather than insisting that state prisoners turn square corners to
comply with an increasingly complex set of rules, the habeas courts should
look upon Justice Black's opinion in Frisbie as the relevant model. Flexibility,
not rigidity, promises genuine success in the task at hand-the sensitive
orchestration of state and federal court attempts to enforce the Constitution.
At least four conclusions follow logically from what I suggest-a return
to Frisbie. First, the courts should stop talking about jurisdiction when dis-
should be demanded. But see Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (198 1) (per curiam), discussed supra in the text
accompanying notes 186-92. The only possible counter is that, presented with one more pertinent allegation, the
state courts might yet award relief. That is not only unrealistic but insensitive to the genuine human price that
would be exacted.
269. The key word here is, of course, "ordinarily." "Special circumstances" will arise in which federal
review should be available promptly. If some verbal formulation is needed to describe those circumstances
beyond what the Supreme Court has said in the past, Judge Friendly's suggestion serves well enough. Prisoners'
failure to exhaust state remedies should be overlooked "in those rare instances where justice so requires."
United States ex rel. Graham v. Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1972).
270. See supra text accompanying note 167.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
272. The Serrano and Harless decisions are to the same effect, nothing more. See supra notes 186-200 and
accompanying text.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 47-56 (proposing that the habeas courts follow the lead in Frisbie
and thus respect the determinations of the lower courts in most instances).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 157-78.
275. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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cussing the exhaustion doctrine and should certainly stop invoking jurisdic-
tional consequences when the doctrine is not satisfied. I do not contend that
Slayton should be abandoned and that habeas petitions should be retained on
the federal docket pending the exhaustion of state remedies.276 While outright
dismissal suggests a jurisdictional flaw that does not exist, it is efficient to use
that device in exhaustion cases rather than to clutter federal dockets with
cases that may be tied up in state court for years and that may never draw
federal attention on the merits.277 Other common practices, also suggesting
jurisdictional difficulty, cannot be similarly justified. The federal habeas
courts should not be concerned with exhaustion if the states' own represent-
atives do not raise and insist upon it. If counsel for the respondent fails to
assert an exhaustion argument in a proper and timely fashion, that procedural
default warrants the normal sanction-forfeiture of any later opportunity to
raise it. 278 If counsel concedes that state remedies have been exhausted, or
waives the matter, the federal courts should again be unconcerned. 2 9 There is
no greater justification for raising the exhaustion question sua sponte in
habeas than in any other context. "If the State voluntarily chooses to submit
to a federal forum, principles of comity do not demand that the federal court
force the case back into the State's own system.-
280
Second, the district courts should exercise sound judgment in all cases.
They should balance the prisoner's interest in the prompt treatment of federal
claims in the federal forum against the interests to be served by demanding
further resort to the state courts. Notwithstanding Serrano, the clarity of a
prisoner's entitlement to relief should be accorded some weight. 28' In every
276. See supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
277. Of course, in some circumstances this dismissal is unwarranted. The Court has recognized as much,
see supra note 149, and other illustrative cases have appeared in the books. When, for example, it appears that
the prisoner will be released from "custody" before he or she can exhaust state remedies and return to the
federal forum, it seems appropriate to hold the case on the docket for a reasonable time. If that is not done, the
prisoner may lose the opportunity for federal adjudication altogether. See Kravitz v. Pennsylvania, 546 F.2d
1100 (3d Cir. 1977).
278. Notwithstanding the cases holding that the federal habeas courts should raise the exhaustion question
sua sponte, see supra note 182, several circuits routinely refuse to entertain exhaustion claims not raised below.
E.g., Morgan v. Wainwright, 676 F.2d 476,477 n. 1 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 380 (1982); Barksdale v.
Blackburn, 670 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234 n.1 (1980) (refusing to
consider a warden's procedural default argument because it had not been raised below).
279. Several circuits do respect state attorneys' concessions that the exhaustion doctrine has been met in a
case. E.g., Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373, 1376 (11 th Cir. 1982); Talamante v. Romero, 620 F.2d 784,786 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 877 (1980); Schmidt v. Hewitt, 573 F.2d 794, 795 (3d Cir. 1978); Triplett v. Wyrick,
549 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir. 1977). Several circuits also permit counsel to waive compliance with the doctrine. E.g.,
Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1982); Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373, 1376 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982); Welsh v.
Mizell, 668 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 235 (1982); Collins v. Auger, 577 F.2d 1107, 1109 n. I
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133 (1979); see supra notes 182-84 (taking note of the contrary authorities
and the circuits that have not yet committed themselves on these questions).
280. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977) (rejecting an abstention
argument); cf. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 29 n.6 (1976) (permitting the military to waive the ordinary
rule that military remedies must be exhausted prior to review in federal habeas); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
396 & n.3 (1975) (reaching the merits when the state did not insist that the federal courts exercise equitable
restraint).
281. I suppose for consistency's sake I must allow that the weakness of claims, as well as their strength,
may properly be considered. At all events, the issue ought to turn on the extent to which dismissal in favor of
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case the federal courts should examine the state remedies asserted to be
available and ask prisoners to pursue them only if they promise a realistic
opportunity for state court adjudication. 282 The habeas courts should not re-
quire such precise pleading in state court that good faith attempts at compli-
ance routinely fall short of the mark. The key determination should be
"whether any of [the] petitioner's claims is so clearly distinct from the claims
he has already presented to the state courts that it may fairly be said that the
state courts have had no opportunity to pass on the claim.- 283 The district
courts should neither overestimate the ability of pro se litigants, demanding
that they articulate complex constitutional theories with great precision, nor
underestimate the intelligence of state judges, suggesting that they cannot
identify a federal claim when they see one.2&I Close cases will come along, but
further litigation in state court would serve the values underlying the exhaustion doctrine. See supra text
accompanying notes 3-6. Yet it also seems reasonable to consider the resources expended on a case in the
federal forum before an exhaustion problem is discovered. As a practical matter, both parties may see an
advantage in immediate federal adjudication of the merits if the habeas proceeding has already come so far
toward a conclusion and further state court proceedings hold no better promise of a final and correct decision.
See Miller v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 1080, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1982) (declining to demand that a prisoner return to state
court when new but cumulative facts were uncovered in a federal evidentiary hearing); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.
Supp. 1189 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (holding that new facts found at the threshold of federal proceedings should prompt
dismissal, but that facts found in a federal hearing should not so long as the character of the claim remains
unchanged); Colville v. Scully, 532 F. Supp. 117, 118 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (treating the merits because the
federal court had already examined the records and read the briefs before discovering an exhaustion issue).
282. In making the necessary decision, the federal courts may fruitfully seek guidance from counsel. If
counsel for the respondent makes a commitment to litigate in state court and insists that those courts will treat
the merits, it may be appropriate to dismiss. E.g., Hoover v. New York, 607 F.2d 1040, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 1979)
(accepting counsel's promise to waive reliance upon a procedural default theory in state court); Rice v. Parratt,
605 F.2d 1091, 1093 (8th Cir. 1979) (resting upon counsel's statement at oral argument that the state courts were
open to hear the prisoner's claim). If, however, it appears that the state courts will not entertain the claim, the
exhaustion doctrine should be found satisfied. E.g., Parton v. Wyrick, 614 F.2d 154, 157 (8th Cir. 1980)
(declining to send a prisoner back to state court when the state's attorney acknowledged that he would seek
dismissal there on a procedural ground), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 846 (1981); accord Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
125 n.28 (1982) (finding Ohio state remedies unavailable).
The determination whether state remedies are realistically open to receive the prisoner should not, how-
ever, rest exclusively upon the assurances of states' attorneys, who have been known to take, shall we say,
expedient positions in such matters. E.g., Powell v. Spalding, 679 F.2d 163, 165 n. I (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that
counsel had argued in federal habeas that the prisoner had failed to exhaust state remedies but had contended in
state court that the same claim had already been considered on the merits and denied); Moore v. Wyrick, 668
F.2d 1007, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 1982) (pointing out that counsel had argued in federal court that federal review
should await the outcome of pending state postconviction proceedings but had contended in those proceedings
that the issue was procedurally foreclosed).
Finally, it bears mention again that if state remedies are found to be unavailable because the state courts are
likely to find a procedural bar, prisoners who are, accordingly, successful on the exhaustion question may find
themselves boxed out of federal court nonetheless on the basis of what may be an adequate state ground of
decision. See supra note 198. In some cases the better course will be to remit the prisoner to state court and thus
to permit those courts to reach the merits and avoid preclusion in habeas. If the state courts award relief, further
resort to the federal forum will be unnecessary. If they treat the merits and deny relief, there is no procedural bar
to habeas thereafter. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 147-54 (1979).
283. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,517 n.18 (1972). The precise pleading standards demanded under the
Second Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Metz, 609 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1979), are entirely out of place in this field.
That circuit's more realistic approach in the recent en banc decision in Daye v. Attorney General was overdue.
See supra note 262.
284. The very existence of the federal collateral remedy in habeas rests, in substantial part, upon the
suspicion that the enforcement of constitutional safeguards in criminal cases cannot be left to the state courts
alone. I share that suspicion and would hardly wish to be understood to propose that the state courts offer such
sensitive treatment of federal claims that federal postconviction review is unnecessary. I do not, however, skid
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a genuine effort on the part of the district courts to employ the exhaustion
doctrine prudently should prove equal to the task.28 5
Third, at least now that the Supreme Court has elaborated the doctrine in
Picard, district court judgments regarding exhaustion should ordinarily be
respected, subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion. Since those
decisions are grounded, on this model, upon the facts of the particular case,
routine appellate review is both unnecessary and unwise. The values pro-
tected by the exhaustion doctrine are hardly served when district court judg-
ments on the merits are upset on appeal simply because an appellate panel
disagrees with the district court's application of the doctrine.2 86 Certainly the
Supreme Court itself should rarely find it appropriate to become involved.
The Court's primary responsibility lies in fashioning guiding principles and
rules in the first instance, not in policing the application of those standards in
to the other extreme and propose that the state courts are so insensitive to federal issues that they cannot
identify them when given a fair opportunity. With Judge Sofaer, I doubt that state judges require "painstaking
guidance as to federal rights." Sabino v. LeFevre, 490 F. Supp. 183, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
285. The federal habeas courts should take seriously the Supreme Court's instructions that the state courts
be given a "fair opportunity" to address the "substance" of prisoners' federal claims. Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 276-78 (1971). Moreover, they should understand that the critical question is not whether prisoners
met some artificially established pleading or briefing standards in state court, but whether they said enough to
warrant the conclusion that the state courts understood, or should have understood, that they were arguing
federal grounds for relief. If prisoners then raise "substantially equivalent," if not "identical," claims in state
and federal court, the exhaustion doctrine should be deemed satisfied. Lindsay v. Henderson, 499 F. Supp. 667,
668-69 n. I (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The books are filled with fitting illustrations. In Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566
(1974), the Court found the exhaustion doctrine satisfied when the prisoner had argued in state court that the
statute under which he had been convicted was vague as applied, but had contended in federal habeas that the
statute was invalid on its face. Id. at 576-78. The best example may be Judge Rosenn's opinion for the court in
Williams v. Holbrook, 691 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1982). 1 wish that such painstaking work were not necessary before
the merits are reached in a habeas case, but until the Supreme Court recognizes the efforts its decisions demand,
I am afraid that the federal habeas courts must reconcile themselves to the task. I only hope that most will bring
to it the care that Judge Rosenn has demonstrated.
In doubtful cases several analytical devices can be brought into play. Pleading standards may fairly be
relaxed in cases in which the prisoner's federal claim was "familiar" and, accordingly, likely to have been
understood as such by the state courts. Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 38 n. 12 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1086 (1981). When it is still unclear whether the prisoner was understood to be making a federal claim, both
the respondent's and the petitioner's briefs should be examined for evidence. A respondent's recognition of a
claim as federal in nature surely provides a basis for finding the exhaustion doctrine satisfied. See Cassesse v.
New York, 530 F. Supp. 694, 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (relying on the state's failure to resist appellate review in the
Supreme Court on the ground that the prisoner had not presented a federal claim properly below).
Even when prisoners referred only to state law and precedents, it is quite possible that the state courts
recognized the federal implications of the matter at hand. In this regard, the Third Circuit's approach is nothing
short of refreshing. Even if a prisoner's claim was couched solely in state law terms, the exhaustion doctrine
should be found satisfied regarding a related, federal claim if treatment of the state law claim called for the same
"method of analysis" required for the federal claim. Bisaccia v. Attorney General, 623 F.2d 307, 309-12 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1981). See Daye v. Attorney General, 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982). This is only
reasonable. If the state courts were given an opportunity to analyze any claim, however denoted, in the way a
prisoner's federal habeas claim must be examined, and relief was denied, it hardly can be proposed that they
would have reached any other result if the prisoner had dressed the claim in federal clothing. More to the point,
perhaps, in such a case the state courts are unlikely to reach a different result if the petitioner is forced to return
to them.
286. Justice Stevens, at least, has come around on this. E.g., Anderson v. Harless, 103 S. Ct. 276, 278-81
(1982) (dissenting opinion) (joined by Marshall & Brennan. J.J.); Bergman v. Burton, 102 S. Ct. 2026, 2027-28
(1982) (dissenting opinion) (joined by Marshall & Blackmun, J.J.).
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individual cases. The Justices' failure to recognize as much was, above all
else, the error in Harless.287
Fourth, the misguided total exhaustion rule in Lundy should be abrogat-
ed, and in its place the position taken previously in most circuits should be
adopted. 288 The values served by the exhaustion doctrine are respected fully if
the district courts dismiss only unexhausted claims, while giving prompt
attention to exhausted claims included in the same petition. At the very most,
dismissal of a mixed petition might be appropriate if exhausted and unex-
hausted claims are so closely related that an attempt to deal with exhausted
claims in isolation would be futile.2 89 At the very least, the federal courts
clearly should not parse pro se petitions to discover previously unidentified,
and thus unexhausted, claims and to justify dismissal of all claims under the
total exhaustion rule.29
287. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens said as much, of course, albeit in
dissent. Anderson v. Harless, 103 S. Ct. 276, 280 (1982).
288. That is to say, the federal habeas courts should dismiss only unexhausted claims and treat exhausted
claims promptly. See United States ex rel. Morano v. Wolff, 511 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. III. 1980).
289. By my count, as many as three of the Justices would prefer the Second Circuit's approach, see supra
note 202, though, of course, the early overruling of Lundy would present problems of a different order. I am not
sure what to make of Justice Marshall's endorsement of the Stevens dissent in Bergman v. Burton, 102 S. Ct.
2026 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting), which, of course, takes Lundy to task. Unfortunately, the best news to date
is that some, though by no means all, of the circuits have refused to invoke the total exhaustion rule in cases
decided at the district level prior to the Lundy decision. But, of course, those cases "will not exist for long." See
Niziolek v. Ashe, 694 F.2d 282, 287 (1st Cir. 1982).
290. I would like to think that Justice O'Connor's response to Justice Brennan's dissent in Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107 (1982), amounts to more than gentle ribbing and actually provides a clear signal that the Justices are
agreed that Lundy should not be taken to this extreme. The primary issue in Isaac was the effect in federal
habeas of a prisoner's procedural default in state court. The Court, speaking through Justice O'Connor, held
that in the circumstances at bar the default operated to foreclose habeas review entirely. Id. at 110. Justice
Brennan dissented bitterly on that issue, but also added the argument that, given Lundy, the procedural default
question should not have been reached. Examining one prisoner's petition closely, Brennan insisted that it
included an unexhausted claim and that, accordingly, the entire petition should have been dismissed. He
charged the Court with ignoring Lundy to choose a different, and vastly more dramatic, basis of decision-
dismissal with prejudice under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 137-44
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
In response Justice O'Connor acknowledged that it was "possible" to construe the prisoner's "confused
petition" to raise the claim that Brennan had identified. Id. at 124 n.25. "Many prisoners," she said, "allege
general deprivations of their constitutional rights and raise vague objections to various state rulings." Id.
Moreover, a "creative appellate judge" (like Brennan, presumably) can "almost always distill from these
allegations an unexhausted due process claim." Id. In Isaac, however, the district court had not identified this
claim, and Justice O'Connor was "reluctant to interpolate an unexhausted claim not directly presented by the
petition." Id. The Lundy decision, she said, "does not compel such harsh treatment of habeas petitions." Id. In
all candor, I have to read O'Connor's comments as tongue-in-cheek, at least in part. It is clear enough that
Justice Brennan's reliance upon Lundy was intended to protect the prisoner in Isaac from a worse fate under
Sykes. Still, her recognition of the havoc that abuse of Lundy might wreak upon federal habeas is, perhaps, a
welcome sign to guide the lower courts. See Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373, 1377-78 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) (relying
upon Isaac for the view that ambiguous habeas petitions should not be read to raise unexhausted claims).

